The legal aspects of funding public education through real property taxation : 1971 Serrano to the present by Coullard, John Burke & NC DOCKS at The University of North Carolina at Greensboro
INFORMATION TO USERS 
This material was produced from a microfilm copy of the original document. While 
the most advanced technological means to photograph and reproduce this document 
have been used, the quality is heavily dependent upon the quality of the original 
submitted. 
The following explanation of techniques is provided to help you understand 
markings or patterns which may appear on this reproduction. 
1. The sign or "target" for pages apparently lacking from the document 
photographed is "Missing Page(s)". If it was possible to obtain the missing 
page(s) or section, they are spliced into the film along with adjacent pages. 
This may have necessitated cutting thru an image and duplicating adjacent 
pages to insure you complete continuity. 
2. When an image on the film is obliterated with a large round black mark, it 
is an indication that the photographer suspected that the copy may have 
moved during exposure and thus cause a blurred image. You will find a 
good image of the page in the adjacent frame. 
3. When a map, drawing or chart, etc., was part of the material being 
photographed the photographer followed a definite method in 
"sectioning" the material. It is customary to begin photoing at the upper 
left hand corner of a large sheet and to continue photoing from left to 
right in equal sections with a small overlap. If necessary, sectioning is 
continued again — beginning below the first row and continuing on until 
complete. 
4. The majority of users indicate that the textual content is of greatest value, 
however, a somewhat higher quality reproduction could be made from 
"photographs" if essential to the understanding of the dissertation. Silver 
prints of "photographs" may be ordered at additional charge by writing 
the Order Department, giving the catalog number, title, author and 
specific pages you wish reproduced. 
5. PLEASE NOTE: Some pages may have indistinct print. Filmed as 
received. 
University Microfilms International 
300 North Zeeb Road 
Ann Arbor, Michigan 48106 USA 
St. John's Road, Tyler's Green 
High Wycombe, Bucks, England HP10 8HR 
7 (i t 
COULL ARL.' t> JviH : 
T H E LEGAL OF f-ijU-n >, P i -HLIC t  IHIC A f J.' J •< 
T H R OUGm R»£Ai. p ^hpf.KTY TaXa'U>i^S 'i V ? 1  StKK^ni 
TO THE 
THE UNlV£*MTY 'F ;-:<jRTH C A WLT'A a1 
GREENS'iOKfs, )cm\ 
Un 
International 300 n. zeeb road, ann arbor, mi 48106 
© 1978 
JOHN BURKE COULLARD 
ALL RIGHTS RESERVED 
THE LEGAL ASPECTS OF FUNDING PUBLIC EDUCATION 
THROUGH REAL PROPERTY TAXATION: 
1971 SERRANO TO THE PRESENT 
by 
John Burke Coullard 
A Dissertation Submitted to 
the Faculty of the Graduate School at 
The University of North Carolina at Greensboro 
in Partial Fulfillment 
of the Requirements for the Degree 
Doctor of Education 
Greensboro 
1978 
Approved by 
ssertation Adviser 
APPROVAL PAGE 
This dissertation has been approved by the following 
committee of the Faculty of the Graduate School at the 
University of North Carolina at Greensboro. 
Dissertation Adviser 
Committee Members UP v 
&> /fyr 
Date of Acceptance by Committee 
Jc> / f? < 
Date of Final Oral Examination 
ii 
ABSTRACT 
COULLARD, JOHN BURKE, The Legal Aspects of Funding Public 
Education Through Real Property Taxation: 1971 Serrano to 
the Present. (1978) 
Directed by: Dr. Joseph E. Bryson. Pp. 114. 
All states use the tax on real property to some degree 
in the financing of public elementary and secondary education. 
The problem of this usage stems largely from the local control 
of the collection and disbursement of the monies by the 
individual school districts. This method is claimed by some 
to create inequities whereby the quality of available educa­
tional opportunity rests on the wealth of the school district 
in which the student resides. Reformers have sought relief 
from these alleged inequities in both the United States 
Constitution's Fourteenth Amendment, and also in the equal 
protection provisions of the various state constitutions. 
The data for this study are contained primarily in 
significant court cases from 1968 to the present. Additional 
data have been collected through a review of the literature, 
which intensified in quantity primarily during the interim 
between Serrano v. Priest in 1971 and Rodriguez v. San 
Antonio Independent School District in 1973. 
An analysis shows that the Fourteenth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution is no longer a viable claim in a 
solution to the wealth versus equal educational opportunity 
problem, and that available redress must be sought in the 
various state courts. At the present time there appears to 
be a decline in interest in legal prosecution, due, perhaps 
to the financial problem of developing a viable alternative 
to taxing property and the distribution of the proceeds by 
the collecting districts. 
The Courts have avoided dictating alternatives to this 
historic method of funding. The courts have also disagreed 
with one another directly on specific .interpretations, and 
also disagreed on the finer points of legal distinctions 
among the state constitutions, thus complicating the value 
of legal precedents. 
This study presents a chronological overview of land­
mark decisions, with supportive cases, thus providing a 
cohesive, chronological treatise of the legal aspects of 
funding public education through the property tax. It shows 
what approaches have been tried, and seeks to direct future 
action into a middle course,. 
In the preparation of such a study, one of so contro­
versial a nature as this, it is impossible to convey the real 
atmosphere of the subject without the occasional reflection 
of the passions involved. To filter out completely the 
emotional reactions to the problem would rather do a 
disservice to the reader by creating a false impression of 
a problem which is apparently beyond a sterile, clinical 
approach to solution. The writer therefore bespeaks the 
tolerance of the readers, on the grounds that the presenta­
tion necessitates an element of realism, recognizing the 
strong disparity of opinion which exists. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Statement of the Problem 
This is an historical study of recent legal developments 
in the area of funding public education in the United States 
through the taxation of real property. The research is 
concerned "with the establishment of the early methods of 
tax funding) the extent to which these practices have been 
and are being challenged and litigated; the reasons for the 
challenges; the results of selected major cases in this 
fieldj and the possible consequences these decisions will 
have upon the methods of funding public school education. 
Procedures Used 
The basi.c research technique of this historical study 
will be to examine and apply the available primary and 
secondary references. Applicable federal and state court 
records contained in the National Reporter System, the 
American Digest System, and United States Reports will be 
the major primary sources. Secondary references include 
books related to the principles of school finance sources, 
and journal articles reflecting the legal and social aspects 
of public school financing in the United States. 
2 
Delimitations 
The questions of sources of tax monies, the effect of 
increased expenditures on the quality of education, and the 
social justification of public education continues to be 
widely debated among educators, legislators, jurists, and 
the general public. Discussion of the subject is usually 
liberally laced with biased rhetoric including attempts to 
relate, and in many cases to equate, the property tax method 
of funding with undemocratic oppression of the poor through 
willfully contrived inequality in educational opportunity, 
racism, and capitalistic class establishment. 
This study will be concerned with the legal questions 
involved. The goal will be objectivity and exposition. No 
effort will be made to select a method or combination of 
methods as an alternative to the presently employed proce­
dures. 
Significance of the Study 
For nearly the entire first two-hundred years of the 
history of the United States, education was considered to 
be largely a local issue. The subject of funding sources 
and funds disbursement was questioned very little. Schools 
were community affairs, and the school district was the 
governmental unit which dealt with education. Some states 
did set up boards of education, with varying degrees of 
authority, but the subject of taxation for the support of 
3 
schools was hardly ever very far from the direct control 
of the local populace. 
The Judicial Branch of our government considered 
taxation and spending as the restricted domain of political 
matters into which it would not enter."'" Up until the mid-
1960s plaintiffs brought to court cases against the uneven 
distribution of public services, particularly those of 
educational expenditures, only to find little interest in 
2 the Courts. This history is similar to others m the area 
of Supreme Court activity—no decisions until a topic becomes 
fashionable, until social pressures bring the subject into 
the political consciousness of the country. 
The social pressure in this case, as pointed out by 
3 
Chalecki, was the spectacular growth of the suburbs, 
coupled with the racially-inspired phrase "flight from the 
cities" which became popular as an epithet in the desegre­
gation struggles of the 1960s. By the end of the decade, 
the Warren Court, with little or no inhibitions about whether 
or not taxing and spending constitute solely political 
1 . . For a statement of the traditional doctrine of non­
intervention, cf., Eugene McQuillan, Law of Municipal 
Corporations, 3rd ed., (Mundeline, Illinois? Callaghan 
Publishing, 1966), sec. 10.33, pp. 823-828. 
2 
cf. as typical, Hawkins v. Town of Shaw, 437 F.2d 1286 
(1971), in which the court intervened to redress racial 
rather than economic discrimination. 
^Richard B. Chalecki, "Is There a Solution? Problems 
in School Finance," NA.SSP Bulletin, 60 (January, 1976), p. 81. 
4 
matters, almost eagerly provided, as Professor Philip 
Kurland rioted, an "activist" base of decisions which lead 
4 
to "the easy case for equal educational opportunity." The 
scene was painted thus: those previously espousing the cause 
of desegregation and still committed but now bored with it 
(The movement was even then succumbing to self-doubt among 
its leaders and to growing opposition in the north. )j urban 
education in a state of near collapse? parochial schools 
closing; and central city public schools seemingly the next 
to go. Expenditures for elementary and secondary education 
were increasing at a more rapid rate than was the market 
value of real property. This either brought about or accom­
panied the so-called "taxpayers' revolt"—the beginning of 
the rejection at the polls of an unprecedented number of 
7 
millage rate increases and bond issues. 
In such an atmosphere, economic reforms often multiply 
4 Philip Kurland, "Equal Educational Opportunitys The 
Limits of Constitutional Jurisprudence Undefined," University 
of Chicago Law Review, 35 (1968), p. 584. 
5 
Judith Areen and Leonard Ross, "The Rodriguez Case: 
Judicial Oversight of School Finance," Supreme Court Review, 
33 (1973), p. 44. 
classis example of the literature of gloom of those 
days is: Charles E. Silberman, Crisis in the Classroom (New 
York; Vintage Books, 1970). 
7 
Betsy Levin, "School Finance Reform m a Post-Rodriquez 
World," Contemporary Legal Problems in Education (Topeka, 
Kansas: The National Organization on Legal Problems of 
Education, 1974), pp. 156-173. 
5 
rapidly, and where the emotional mixture of education and 
children were involved, the activity was remarkable. 
Scholars expounded, developed and defined the thesis that 
the method of financing education through the local property 
tax was not only inequitable but unconstitutional. In 1968, 
Wise had written a major position supporting the issue of 
equal educational opportunity. Wise maintained that the 
equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires 
that the quality of education within a state may not vary 
with geography or wealth. He based this upon three major 
premises supported by court decisions: 
1 - -"The opportunity of an education, . . . where 
the state has undertaken to provide it, is a right g 
which must be made available to all on equal terms." 
2 - . .a man's mere property status, without more, 
cannot be used by a state to test, qualify, or limit 
his rights as a citizen of the United States."10 
3 - ". • . there is no indication in the Constitution, 
that homesite . . . affords a permissible basis for 
distinguishing between qualified voters within the 
State. 
Of even greater impact, certainly receiving greater publicity 
1 2 because of its deep involvement in the Serrano proceedings, 
8 Arthur E. Wise, Rich Schools, Poor Schools (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1968). 
^Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) at 493. 
^^Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160 (1941) at 184. 
^Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368 (1963) at 380. 
^Serrano v. Priest, 96 Cal.Rptr. 601 (1971 ). 
6 
was the powerful simplification of the concept stated by 
Coons, Clune, and Sugarman: . . the quality of public 
education may not be a function of wealth other than the 
13 
total wealth of the state." 
It is interesting to consider that at this time the 
publicly accepted point of view began to lose patience with 
the time-honored and formerly much-praised principle of 
local control of schools. People began to lose fear of 
central control and it became the vogue to accept as a fact 
the "need for broad based funding." More money for the 
loosely defined "disadvantaged" was a Good Thing, and the 
reformers were ready to sacrifice old-fashioned principles 
about local control. Broad implications were ignored, as 
they so often are, in enthusiasm for an ideal. As Areen 
and Ross warn" 
. . . such modifications involve value judgments of 
a kind which a simple judicial formula must seek to 
avoid. For a court to determine that each handicapped 
child is worth 2.3 times the allotment of the normal 
child demands the same cabalistic insight as giving 
rural Tennessee 2.3 times the voting power of urban 
Tennessee.14 
15 
When the Serrano case reached the courts it was 
13 . 
John E. Coons, William H. Clune III and Stephen D. 
Sugarman, Private Wealth and Public Education (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1970), p. 304. 
14 Areen and Ross, ojd. cit. , p. 44. 
^Serrano v. Priest, 96 Cal.Rptr. 601 (1971). 
7 
decided, after exhaustive studies, in favor of the principle 
advanced by Coons, Clune, and Sugarman. 
17 
Two years after Serrano, the Rodriguez decision m 
the United States Supreme Court threw reformers into further 
confusion by rejecting a constitutional challenge to the 
property tax method of school finance. Confused but not 
denied, the cause against property tax funding continued to 
seek in the states what it could not muster within the 
federal constitution. The most significant, to date, of 
18 
these cases was that of Robinson v. Cahill where the New 
Jersey Supreme Court ordered the State Legislature to provide 
funds for a "thorough and efficient system of free public 
19 
schools," as provided m that state's constitution. 
In this atmosphere, school finance has become the sub­
ject of an extraordinary and topically instructional chapter 
in the history of judicial reform. "It is a history that 
must still be written on loose-leaf pages, like the Great 
Soviet Encyclopedia, allowing for short-notice reversals 
20 
between dogma and heresy." 
^op. cit. , p. 304. 
^Rodriguez v. San Antonio, 411 U.S. 1 (1973). 
18303 A.2d 273 (1973). 
19 
Article VIII, sec. 4, para. 1. 
20 
Areen and Ross, op. cit., p. 33. 
8 
Thus this study is significant in that it will present 
an analysis of the three most influential court cases, pro­
viding for educational advisers and decision makers a con­
cise, complete reference to the legality of property tax 
funding of education, and guidelines to observe when making 
decisions regarding the complexities of financing public 
education. This is of particular significance after the 
Rodriguez case has established an interpretation of the 
Constitution at such fundamental variance with the popularly 
held opinions of the alleged rights involved. It is essen­
tial that decision makers deal in the facts as established 
by each of these landmark cases, and in the interrelation­
ships belonging to these cases. This study will provide 
such a vehicle of appropriate fundamentals. 
Organization of the Remainder of the Study 
The balance of this study will be divided into four 
major parts. Chapter II will contain an historical intro­
duction and review of educational funding before Serrano, 
highlighting the colonial practices and their European 
foundations, and the nineteenth and twentieth century methods 
and problems. This will provide a brief history of the 
development of the property tax method of funding, leading 
to the social entanglements which resulted in Serrano. 
Chapter III will enlarge upon the legal aspects of the 
9 
immediate forces which led to the inevitable Serrano decision 
and its effects, and will also discuss the other two land­
mark cases—Rodriguez and Robinson. 
Chapter IV will present an analysis of other pertinent 
litigation recently decided in the field of public school 
funding through property taxes. 
Chapter V will present, briefly, a summary and conclu­
sions drawn from the information advanced in the preceeding 
chapters. An effort will be made to establish some beacons 
to guide constructive thinking in this very controversial 
area. 
10 
CHAPTER II 
REVIEW OF EDUCATIONAL FINANCE BEFORE SERRANO 
European Origins 
It is difficult for the modern American to understand 
the attitudes toward education which existed in Europe prior 
to and even as the American colonies were being founded. Our 
schools teach us of the great revival of art, literature, and 
learning which began in Europe in the fourteenth century—the 
Renaissance. Starting in Italy, it spread gradually for 
three hundred years to other countries, marking the trans­
ition from the medieval world to the modern era. The Ren­
aissance is depicted as a vibrant time—a time in which man 
developed and expanded the knowledge rediscovered during the 
Crusades, a time which produced the Reformation, a time of 
exploration, a quickening of trade, and a period of evolution 
of the early universities. 
For many, the Renaissance is imagined as a popular­
ization of education. Stories abound about poor youths who 
were taken into the monastery school, there to learn and 
ultimately to rise above the station in life which birth 
had given. There may even have been a certain amount of 
this sort of thing, but it was far from common. That class 
to which we now refer as the common man was overwhelmingly 
11 
left out of the educational process. The schools still 
largely followed the model established by Charlemagne and 
Alcuin to educate the royal family, the nobility, and the 
cl ergy. * 
The class system prevailed throughout the years of the 
Renaissance, and England, the country which influenced the 
development of the United States more than any other, was no 
exception. The dominating influence in England before and 
during the American colonial period was aristocratic. The 
social position of the commoner was fixed by the accepted 
belief that the masses were born to obey, not to govern, 
and that education of the lower classes was both unnecessary 
and dangerous. This belief was so strong that the simple 
people looked upon the priviliged aristocrats as superior 
2 beings. It was a principle of governance for those m 
authority to keep the poor in ignorance. It was believed 
that learning among the masses would threaten the estab­
lished order and lead not only to disobedience but to 
revolution. 
This was probably the view of most of the American 
colonists, if they had views on the matter at all. 
1cf. the brief description by Paul Monroe, History of 
Education (New Yorks Macmillan, 1917), pp. 274-278. 
2  . . .  Edgar W. Knight, Education in the United States 
(Bostons Ginn and Company, 1929), p. 64. 
12 
Governor Berkeley of Virginia, in his remarkable reply 
to the authorities in England in 1671, thanked God that 
there were no free schools and no printing presses in 
that province, and hoped that there would be none for a 
hundred years. "Learning," he said, "has brought dis­
obedience, and heresy, and sects into the world, and 
printing has divulged them, and libels against the best 
government. God Keep us from both!"3 
It was this theory, not the modern dream of improvement 
toward equality, which governed, retarding the growth of 
public education in England and even acting to delay the 
development of public education in the early United States. 
During the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth 
centuries, education was held to be a responsibility of the 
family and the Church. The State was not involved in the 
process except for a minor regulatory role. The Church had 
a monopoly on education in the middle ages, and even after 
the establishment of the Church of England in the sixteenth 
century, the practice continued. The crown, which was also 
the head of the Church, required school teachers to hold 
licenses issued by the Church, and dissenters from the Church 
of England were not allowed licenses. It was not until the 
last quarter of the' eighteenth century that the Church began 
3 
ibid. cf. also, Paul Monroe, Founding of the American 
Public School System (New York: Hafner Publishing, 1971, 
facsimile of 1940 ed.) where this quotation is listed in v. I, 
p. 53, but with exceptions taken. Monroe believes that there 
were "free schools" in Virginia at the time and states that 
Berkeley had even contributed funds to the program. Monroe 
does not, however, explain the economic class which attanded 
this school. 
13 
to establish the Sunday school for instruction, not only in 
religion, but also in the elements of reading and writing. 
4 Thus, even though some writers like to infer that 
popular education had its origin in the Reformation, it is 
a rather long stretch to imply that the culmination of the 
Renaissance was realized in the mid-nineteenth century! If 
it be true that 
Under the new theory of individual responsibility 
promulgated by the Protestants the education of all 
classes became a vital necessity.5 
then it appears that the Reformation was quite sluggish in 
causing the realization of this "vital necessity." 
Our European origins may have provided some of the 
elements of modern education, but not the foundation of 
organization or of equality of educational opportunity. 
It was not until after the Colonial period in America that 
g 
England began to be interested in the education of the poor. 
Public funding of education was understandably not a part of 
an educational system which provided only for the wealthy, 
the privileged, the aristocratic. 
4  . . . .  
Ellwood P. Cubberley, Public Education in the United 
States (Bostons Houghton Mifflin, 1934), pp. 6-10. 
5 . ibid., p. 9. 
^The principles of public support and public control 
of schools in England were not established until 1870. cf. 
Knight, op. cit., p. 67. This law (Elementary Education Act; 
33 and 34 Victoria, chap. 75) is listed in the essential 
parts by Ellwood P. Cubberley, Readings in the History of 
Educati on (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1920), p. 534. 
14 
Some attempt has been made to infer that because the 
English Poor Laws of 1597 and 1601 had provisions for appren­
tice fees, these laws became a scheme of taxation to secure 
7 
the education of the poor. Whether or not this can be 
accepted depends largely on one's definition of the word 
"education.M Certainly the apprentice programs of the six­
teenth century cannot be equated to the educational process 
of even the seventeenth-century schools of Massachusetts. 
Colonial America 
It is human nature that Englishmen would tend to do 
similar things in their new land, and, in general, the 
customs of England were adapted to the situations found on 
O 
the new frontiers. Just as their settlements differed 
according to geographical, climatic, and topographical 
conditions, so did these factors influence and modify the 
cultural heritage which the colonists brought from Europe. 
In New England, the Puritans (Calvinists) established 
and maintained an educational orientation of lasting influ­
ence. They brought with them from England the strong Cal-
9 
vmist theory that piety was based on intelligence. To 
7 . . 
Paul Monroe, Founding of the American Public School 
System (New York: Hafner Publishing, 1971, facsimile of 1940 
ed.), v. I, p. 11. 
8 
Gerald Lee Gutek, An Historical Introduction to Amer­
ican Education (New York: Thos. Y. Crowell, 1970), pp. 9-10. 
9 
Monroe, 0£. cit., v. I, pp. 31-33. 
15 
them, education was an instrument of religious salvation, 
providing the means by which a person might study the Bible, 
Calvinist doctrine, and also the general laws of the Common­
wealth. It was a rigid system based on their concept of the 
need for the training of the young, who were believed to be 
savage creatures, conceived in sin and treated as miniature 
adults.A law was enacted in 1642 which required parents 
and guardians (including apprentices' masters) to attend to 
their children's ability to read and understand the princi-
11 
pies of religion and the laws of the Commonwealth. This 
law closely followed the English Poor Law of 1601 which 
12 
required apprenticeship of pauper children. In 1647, the 
General Court enacted the famous "Ould deluder, Satan Law" 
which required every town of 50 or more families to "appoint 
one within their towne to teach all such children as shall 
resort to him to write and reade," and the law further pro­
vided that the teacher's "wages shall be paid either by ye 
parents or masters of such children, or by ye inhabitants 
^Stanford Fleming, Children and Puritanism; The 
Place of Children in the Life and Thought of the New England 
Churches, 1620-1847 (New Havens Yale University Press, 
1933). This book is a remarkable treatise of life of the 
New England child. 
1 1  . . .  Ellwood P. Cubberley, Readings in the History of 
Education (Bostons Houghton Mifflin, 1920), p. 298. 
1 2  Edgar W. Knight, Education in the United States 
(Boston: Ginn and Company, 1929), p. 100. 
16 
in general . . . 
Two other laws previously passed by the General Court 
in 1634 and 1638 which established the principle of common 
14 taxation of all property for town and colony benefits. 
It is easy at this point to jump to a conclusion that these 
laws anticipated and actually are the foundation of the 
publicly-supported, state-controlled schools which we now 
enjoy. This is an oversimplification as an analysis will 
show. 
The four laws in question did establish certain 
significant points, however. First, the state could compel 
education. The Law of 1642 provided this precedent, but 
it did not establish complusory attendance at a school. 
Second, the state could require civil units to maintain 
teachers. This was done in the Law of 1647, but again there 
was no forced attendance, just "such children as shall resort 
to him." Third, both of these laws provided for the super­
vision and control of education by civil authorities. 
Fourth, permission was granted, but no order given, to use 
public funds to support education. Fifth, those public funds, 
if used, could be raised by common taxation of all property. 
13 Cubberley, og. cit., p. 299. 
1 4  . . . .  Ellwood P. Cubberley, Public Education in the Urnted 
States (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1934), p. 14. 
17 
It must be constantly kept in mind that these schools 
were created primarily for religious reasons, especially 
for the ability to read and understand the principles of 
religion and the capital laws of this country. These 
schools were indeed a beginning, but were severely res­
tricted in matters of curriculum. They were supported in 
a variety of ways, not all by property taxation. One 
quaint system of revenue was provided for by the Plymouth 
Colony in 1673. 
It is ordered by the Court that the charge of the 
free Scoole, which is three and thirty pounds a yeare 
shalbe defrayed by the Treasurer out of the proffitts 
ariseing by the ffishing att the Cape vntil such Time 
as that the minds of the ffreemen be knowne concerning 
it which wilbe returned to the next Court of election.15 
Worth mentioning to strengthen the understanding of 
the elitism prevalent in early education is the New England 
Latin Grammar School. This was a program for the sons of 
New England's social, political, and religious elite. 
Children destined for this special education did not enter 
the school directly from the town schools, but learned first 
to read and write either in the household dame schools or 
other forms of private tutorage. The Latin Grammar School 
taught Latin and Greek as the languages of the educated 
class. Entering at the age of eight, the jjovs studied 
1 5  . . .  Ellwood P. Cubberley, Readings in the History of 
Education (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1920), p. 302. 
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Cicero, Terence, Caesar, Livy, Virgil, Horace, Isocrates, 
Hesiod, and Homer for another eight years. Utilitarian 
subjects such as mathematics, science, history, and modern 
languages were ignored. 
The history of..public education in colonial Massa­
chusetts is essentially the history of education in colonial 
New England. That Commonwealth originally embraced what is 
now Maine and New Hampshire too, so their systems and prac­
tices were used throughout the major part of the section. 
Vermont was not settled until 1724 and schools developed 
slowly there. 
In southern New England the colonies of Connecticut 
and New Haven (joined together in 1665) were under laws 
very similar to those of Massachusetts. Rhode Island had 
no school system until 1790.^^ 
In the South and in the middle Atlantic states, the 
matter of education was almost strictly private. There was 
no school system in any colony south of Connecticut before 
17 the Revolution. There were various local schools estab­
lished by the religious sects, each having its own notion 
of culture and how to transmit it. None of them had a last­
ing impact of any significance, and the American colonial 
X 6 Richard G. Boone, Education in the United States 
(New York; D. Appleton and Company, 1890), pp. 47-53. 
17 ibid., p. 58. cf. also, Gutek, o£. cit., pp. 15-20. 
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educational experience remains basically a reconstruction 
of English institutions imported into New England and modi­
fied to suit the social and religious environment of a 
Calvinist society. 
Nineteenth Century Upheaval 
There is little to discuss.about American education in 
the period of the War of Independence. The effect of the 
war on all types of schools was disastrous. Some schools 
closed, others continued to operate intermittently. Some 
schools in the cities managed to operate, but even there the 
so-called charity schools suffered or closed, leaving the 
18 private pay schools to keep open longest. 
The end of the war saw a bankrupt government whose 
major concern was survival. The period from the surrender 
of Cornwallis at Yorktown in 1781 to the adoption of the 
Constitution in 1789 was critical. The government and the 
country paid little attention to education. In the Consti­
tution itself there is no use of the word "education" nor 
is there any reference to the subject. It is interesting 
to note that so far as there is any record of the subject 
in the discussions at the constitutional convention, it was 
a single question relating to the power under the new 
18 Ellwood P. Cubberley, Public Education in the United 
States (Bostons Houghton lifflin, 1934), p. 82. 
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Constitution to establish a national university. There was 
19 no question or discussion about public education. 
Considering the times, this should not be surprising. 
The modern belief in education for all, and education's 
paramount importance is simply not applicable to the period 
of the American Revolution. The founders of the Republic 
were educated men, not ignorant bigots, but they held the 
subject of education to be still a private matter, generally 
20 
under the control of the Church. The New England attitude 
was a singular exception, both in this country and even 
abroad. Education was still generally considered to be a 
luxury, not a necessity. To be illiterate was no reproach, 
and it was possible to follow many pursuits successfully 
with no more education than that of daily work and experi-
21 ence. 
There were some exceptions among the founders of the 
nation, but their success in promoting general education 
for the public was less than astounding. In the writings 
of Jefferson, Washington, General Francis Marion, John Jay, 
19. . ibid., p. 84. cf. also, Ellwood P. Cubberley, 
Changing Conceptions of Education (Bostons Houghton 
Mifflin, 1909), p. 29. 
2 0  .  . . .  Edgar W. Knight, Education in the United States 
(Bostons Ginn and Company, 1929), p. 144. 
2 1  . . . .  Ellwood P. Cubberley, Public Education in the United 
States (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1934), pp. 110-111. 
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John Hancock, John Adams and James Madison, to name but a 
few, there appears strong advocacy for the promotion of 
29 science literature, and general education. Although 
some writers have attached specific meanings to these 
declarations, seemingly to ascribe additional halos of 
wisdom to these men, it is considerably doubtful that 
those living in the first decade of the nineteenth century 
had prescience of the circumstances and problems of the 
twentieth century. Rather they were defending the concept 
of education because of the severe curtailment of schools 
in their period, but little was said about system, curriculum 
or funding. 
The general population of the country was also not 
clamoring for public education. A large proportion of them 
felt that those desirous of an education should'pay for it. 
A Rhode Island farmer stated that it would be as sensible 
to propose taking his plough away from him to plough his 
neighbor's field as taking his money away from him to educate 
his neighbor's child. Some felt that free education should 
be in the form of pauper schools limited to children of the 
poor, and only for the rudiments of learning. Others felt 
?2 
cf. Cubberley, o]o. cit. , pp. 88-91, and also Knignt, 
op. cit., pp. 146-156. 
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that all forms of education should remain with the churches 
23 and educational societies. 
An eminent educator states: 
No other single problem connected with education 
presented greater difficulties to our forefathers than 
that of its support. To begin with, most of them 
agreed with Jefferson than that government is best 
which governs least. Certainly they believed that 
government to be best which taxes least. But they 
quite generally disagreed with Jefferson when he held 
that the support of education is one of the undoubted 
responsibilities of government.24 
Of the twenty-three states in the Union by 1820, only 
thirteen had made any mention of education in their state 
constitutions. Of these, seven—Connecticut, Maine, Massa­
chusetts, New Hampshire, New York, Ohio, and Vermont—had 
laws to provide for the implementation of acceptable systems. 
These were the five Calvinist New England states, plus those 
25 two most influenced by settlers from New England. The 
schools were financed either through property taxes and/or 
funds. Taxes were generally "local, optional, and permis­
sive" and the "rate bill"--a fee, or tuition, controlled by 
23 Ellwood P. Cubberley, Chanqing Conceptions of Educa-
tion (Bostons Houghton Mifflin, 1909), p. 28. cf. also 
Knight, op. cit., pp. 153-156, and also P. A. SiljestrOm, 
The Educational Institutions of the United States, tr. F. 
Rowan (Londons John Chapman, 1853), p. 16. 
24 . . Paul Monroe, Founding of the American Public School 
System (New York; Hafner Publishing, 1971, facsimile of 1940 
ed.), v. I, p. 295. 
25 Ellwood P. Cubberley, Public Education in the United 
States (Bostons Houghton Mifflin, 1934), p. 97. 
23 
the number of children the family had in school—continued 
26 
to operate in some places well into the nineteenth century. 
But these were not the only methods used to provide income 
to schools. In addition to fishing revenues cited above, 
there were salt workings, lotteries, funds from gongressional 
and state land grants, and even the distribution of a federal 
27 treasury surplus (!) in 1836. Also used were occupational 
taxes, insurance premium taxes, bank taxes, liquor license 
fees, theater fees—but the population was increasing too 
rapidly for these indeterminate and uncontrollable revenue 
systems to cover the growing expenses. This is quite an 
indictment because the fact is that as much as education 
needs were outrunning the inadequate funding in some loca­
tions, it can hardly be said that an educational conscious­
ness had developed before c. 1820 (except in New England and 
New York). Even in New England there was a steady decline 
28 in education during the first fifty years of the nation. 
The vitality of the new nation eventually changed the 
popular attitude toward education. The rise of a new nation­
al government based on principles of legal and political 
equality and also upon religious freedom helped to effect 
2 6 Knight, op. cit., p. 155. 
27 Boone, 0£. cit., pp. 85-92. 
28 Cubberley, o£. cit., p. 110. 
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these changes. New economic conditions began slowly to 
create the realization that education was necessary for 
economic as well as political (and religious) ends. This 
pressure gradually became too much for the churches to 
handle, especially so since most of them still were inter­
ested only in education for salvation of the soul, and this 
patent inadequacy opened the path for secular schools, with 
more dependence upon government taxation for finance. 
The path was not smooth. Much of the original work 
was done by several semi-private philanthropic agencies, 
each introducing different factors influencing both curri­
culum and funding. The infant schools, the Lancastrian and 
29 
the Bell monitorial schools, the secular Sunday schools 
all operated to create and nurture the concept of education 
for all. Indeed, education as a need in a republic began to 
be recognized. Thomas Jefferson had said that if a nation 
expects to be ignorant and free in a state of civilization 
30 
it expects what never was and never will be. State 
governors, legislators, political leaders at all levels, and 
workingmen began to be heard calling for more and better 
29 cf. Knight, op. cit., pp. 160-170, and also Cubber-
ley, op. cit., p. 120-143, for specific details on the 
effects these schools had upon the development of common 
schools. 
30 A letter written m 1816 to a Colonel Yancey, quoted 
in Cubberley, 0£. cit., p. 89. 
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education in free state schools. The response was still 
far from unanimous. 
The second quarter of the nineteenth centurv may 
be said to have witnessed the battle for tax-supported, 
publically controlled and directed, and non-sectarian 
common schools. In 1825 such schools were the distant 
hope of statesmen and reformers; in 185 0 they were 
becoming an actuality in almost every Northern State. 
The twenty-five years intervening marked a period of 
public agitation and educational propaganda; of many 
hard legislative fights; . . . Excepting the battle 
for the abolition of slavery, perhaps no question has 
ever . . . caused so much feeling or aroused such 
bitter antagonisms. Old friends and business asso­
ciates parted company . . . , lodges were forced to 
taboo the subject to avoid disruption, ministers and 
their congregations often quarreled over the question 
of free schools . . .31 
There were even serious questions over the fundamental 
issue of whether or not a state had the right to educate. 
This was more than a local issue raised by ultra-conserva­
tives. The question was of prime importance even in England 
where debates were held in Parliament over the matter™ In 
one of these Macaulay is reported to have said that if a 
state has a right to hang people, it must certainly have 
32 the right to educate them. 
In such an atmosphere, the subject of funding was one 
of the major battles to be fought. As the argument against 
the theory of the common school declined, it was replaced 
31 Cubberley, ojd. cit. , p. 164. 
3 9  ,  
SiljestrOm, ojd. ext., p. 18. 
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by the problems of finance. Earlier ideas, which for a time 
seem to have been generally held, that the income from land 
grants, fees and endowment funds would eventually stabilize 
and provide complete support for the necessary schools, were 
abandoned as it was discovered how little these incomes kept 
up with growing needs. 
It is to be expected that a nation which had fought a 
Revolution against "taxation without representation" would 
find all forms of taxation to some degree abhorrent. And 
yet, to provide the free common school there was no alterna­
tive. Progress was slow. At first, permission was granted 
by the legislative bodies to communities to taxi.themselves, 
usually in the form of property taxes, for school support. 
This began in the towns and cities and usually preceeded 
action by the state as a whole. In Rhode Island, Providence 
began schools in 1800, Newport in 1825 whereas the first 
general law came in 1828. New York City in 1805 predated 
the state school law by seven years. In Pennsylvania, it 
was Philadelphia in 1812, Harrisburg and Pittsburg in 1821, 
and Lancaster in 1822, while the state school law passed in 
1834. Baltimore in 18 25 was a year ahead of the state. In 
the south, Charleston's schools (started in 1811) were made 
free in 1856 whereas no South Carolina state school system 
was established until after the War Between the States, and 
Alabama's state school law of 1854 was 28 years behind 
27 
Mobile's schools. There are other examples of early per­
missive state legislation in New Jersey (1820), Missouri 
(1824), Illinois (1825), Virginia (1829), Kentucky (1830), 
North Carolina (1839), Iowa (1840), Mississippi (1846), 
Indiana (1848), and Tennessee (1854).33 
The movement from the permissive taxation by the 
cities or counties was no more uniform than that of the 
beginnings of the permissive taxation. If any pattern could 
be identified it would be only one of a general geographic 
progression with New England and the Midwest being the first 
to follow the model established by Massachusetts, then a 
more gradual change to the Middle Atalntic States. The 
34 
movement did not permeate the South until after 1865. 
A general outline of the course which resulted in 
compulsory, free school education and therefore compulsory 
taxation can be divided into four phases. First came the 
permissive legislation which recognized the school district 
as an administrative unit with taxing powers. In the second 
phase the state encouraged the formation of school districts 
by providing financial aid from permanent school funds which 
existed from the various funding plans mentioned above— 
33cf. Cubberley, oo„. cit. , pp. 180-181, and Knight, 
op. cit., pp. 261-262. 
34 
'Gutek, o£. cit.., p. 53. 
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monies from the sale of land, lotteries, federal allotment, 
and state taxes. This phase was still not compulsory, but 
the financial incentive provided did weaken opposition. The 
third phase introduced the factor of compulsion, but was not 
the last step toward free education. The formation of school 
districts was required, but the state and district financial 
support remained inadequate, forcing many to charge a tui­
tion, called a "rate bill," for each student attending. Thus 
everyone paid a tax base, but those using the schools were 
required to pay an additional assessment. The final phase 
was the passage of legislation providing for the establish­
ment of compulsory and completely tax supported public edu-
35 cation. 
The movement, once begun, was inexorable. With the 
beginning of state financial aid, also began state control, 
and the greater the aid, the greater the control. The State 
became a power and could enforce compliance with their gen­
eral regulations. School districts which refused received 
no state funds, and as expenditures continued to increase, 
the burden of independence became more than they could bear. 
The payment of state taxes without receiving a portion of 
the revenue in return actually amounted to double taxation 
for the service. District pride succumbed to economic 
pressure. 
35 ., . , lead. 
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In the course of establJ.shi.ng the compulsory common 
school, one of the battles fought was that of eliminating 
the pauper-school idea--either a separate school for the poor 
or special treatment for those children whose parents could 
not pay a full rate-bill assessment. It was an important 
battle, but one whose outcome could have been foretold as 
the conception of egalitarianism grew. The struggle viewed 
in the light of twentieth century sophistication appears 
primitive ana quaint, but it is still worthy of comment if 
for no other reason than the soaring rhetoric involved. And 
it seems to remind one of the modern hyperbole on the subject 
of equality and discrimination. 
In Pennsylvania, the Free-School Law of 18 34 was 
defended by Thaddeus Stevens. 
This law is often 'objected to, because its benefits 
are shared by the children of the profligate spendthrift 
equally with those of the most industrious and economical 
habits. It ought to be remembered that the benefit is 
bestowed, not upon the erring parents, but the innocent 
children. Carry out this objection and you punish child­
ren for the crimes or misfortunes of their parents. You 
virtually establish cases and grades founded on no merit 
of the particular generation, but on the demerits of 
their ancestors; an aristocracy of the most odious and 
insolent kind--the aristocracy of wealth and pride.36 
In Virginia, a report of a state educational convention 
(c. 1850) raised a moral objection to the pauper schools in 
that it was wrong to spend public funds, which belonged to 
3 6 Quoted in Knight, ojo. cit. , p. 270. 
all, for the benefit only of the poor? 
Is it right to take the property of the many and 
bestow it exclusively on the few? . . . They are the 
privileged class, the aristocracy of poverty. Now is 
it right to exclude from all the benefits of the liter­
ary fund all the children of this glorious old common­
wealth, except those who put in the plea of rags and 
dirt? . . . Can this injustice and partiality benefit 
the poor children? Is it a law of humanity, that to 
lift up, you must first degrade, that to elevate the 
soul and spirit of a child, you must first make him a 
public pauper? . . . Has the pauper system of educa­
tion diminished the number of your intellectual paupers 
Or is it, like every other system of legally supported 
pauperism, a fire that feeds itself?37 
A convention in New Jersey in 1838 also rejected the 
concept of the pauper schools in language so soaring that 
even the logic of Virginia pales. 
We utterly repudiate as unworthy, not of freemen 
only, but of men, the narrow notion that there is to 
be an education for the poor as such. Has God provided 
for the poor a coarser earth, a thinner air, a paler 
sky? Does not the glorious sun pour down his golden 
flood as cheerily on the poor man's hovel as upon the 
rich man's palace? Have not the cotter's children as 
keen a sense of all the freshness, verdure, fragrance, 
melody, and beauty of luxuriant nature as the pale sons 
of kings? Or is it on the mind that God has stamped 
the imprint of a baser birth, so that the poor man's 
child knows with an inborn certainty that his lot is 
to crawl, not climb? It is not so. God has not done 
it. Man cannot do it. Mind is immortal. Mind is 
imperial. It bears no mark of high or low, of rich or 
poor. It asks but freedom. It requires but lights.38 
The more things change, the more they are the same! 
37 Quoted m Knight, 0£. cit., p. 267. 
3 8 Quoted in Cubberley, o£. cit., p. 197. 
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The battle continued on a local basis veil into the 
second half of the century as the population grew westward 
and as the South recovered from the devastation of the war 
and Reconstruction. By 1874, the precedent had been estab-
39 • lished and tested that high schools are a legitimate 
extension of the common school and a proper use of tax 
funds. 
The nineteenth century upheaval in the funding of 
education was largely over by 1871 when New Jersey, the 
40 
last state in the Union to do so, abolished the rate bill. 
The problems continued, however, switching the emphasis from 
largely those of method to those of size. The period was 
one of great industrial growth and national development. 
The schools saw a tremendous change in emphasis. The old 
reason for education (to provide the basis for religious 
development) was reversed and the school was asked to direct 
its efforts to a more utilitarian purpose—a preparation for 
participation in the political and economic growth of the 
nation. By 1900, the schools had undergone a transformation 
from mere disciplinary training in the rudiments of learning 
and were aspiring to a broader enterprise. Increased 
Stuart v. Kalamazoo, 30 Mich. 69 (1874). 
40 Ernest Carroll Moore, Fifty Years of American 
Education (Boston: Ginn and Company, 1917), p. 43. 
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expenditures were viewed as a necessity as practical men 
took the old systems of education to task, demanding that 
4 1  . . . .  the shortcomings be corrected. Schools gained signifi­
cantly in dignity, power, influence--and cost. 
Between 1870 and 1900, the United States Census shows 
an increase in population from 34,905,000 to 76,094,000--
almost a doubling in thirty years. The number of student 
42 days of attendance increased by a factor of 2.4. The 
rise in the value of school property in the same period 
was from $130,383,008 to $550,069,217—an increase of over 
4 times. The total expenditures for education increased 
from $63,000,000 to $215,000,000—a growth of nearly 3.4 
times—but the per capita expenditure increase was only 
1.7 times higher at the end of the period than at the 
, • 43 beginning. 
It is necessary to look at the combination of these 
statistics to form an opinion, but the conclusion must be 
that size and growth were major problems. Indeed, the 
character of education was foreshadowed in the observations 
of a professor of education at the then Leland Stanford 
41 cf. Ellwood P. Cubberley, Changing Conceptions of 
Education (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1909), pp. 41-45. 
42 Moore, op. cit., pp. 60-61. 
43. . ibid., pp. 62-63. 
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Junior University. 
The new period of advance which we now seem to be 
entering also bids fair to be very paternalistic, per­
haps even socialistic, in the matter of education. The 
old principle, fought for so vigorously fifty or sixty 
years ago, that the wealth of the state must educate 
the children of the state, bids fair to be even further 
extended with a view to a greater equalization of both 
the burdens and the advantages of education. Poor and 
overburdened towns and districts will be supplied with 
sufficient means to enable them to provide a good school 
for their children, and the present great difference 
in tax rates, to provide practically the same educational 
advantages, will be in large part equalized by the 
state.44 
The Stability before Serrano 
In the first half of the twentieth century the most 
salient characteristic of education in this country was the 
growth in size. With a population only doubling in that 
period, public school expenditures rose by 2,615 per cent. 
From 1950 to 1970 the disparity is just as phenomenal, con­
sidering the larger base from which it started. Population 
grew approximately 36 per cent while school expenditures 
45 rose by 597 per cent. 
Nearly all of this growth was financed by state and 
local taxes. In 1970., Federal expenditures for public school 
46 education amounted to only 8 per cent, the remainder being 
A4 
Cubberley, op. cit., p. 62. 
45 Bureau of the Census, United States Department of Com-
Merce, Historical Statistics of the United States (Washing­
ton: Government Printing Office, 1975), I, 8, 373-374. 
46., . , ibid. 
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collected almost exclusively from state and local property 
47 taxes. The property tax has never been popular. It is a 
regressive tax as enforced by the states and has been a 
constant target of the taxpayers and egalitarians alike. 
Wishful thinking has produced constant predictions that the 
property tax is doomed. In 1924 one educator wrote thats 
Although there is a strong tendency to depend less 
than formerly upon the general property tax, due to a 
growing recognition within the past decade of the un­
soundness of this tax, it still remains the most 
universally employed of all taxes.48 
And again: 
It is a realization of the unfairness of existing 
systems of local support and local control and the dis­
astrous and incurable evils produced by such systems 
that has led many scientific students of education and 
several of our states to give serious consideration to 
the possibilities of deriving a much larger proportion 
of school revenues from units more capable than school 
districts of equalizing school revenues, burdens, and 
opportuniti es.49 
It is difficult to determine just how prevalent this 
attitude was. It did persist, however, as it still does 
47 At one time a number of states raised a portion of 
the revenues for school expenditures by a poll tax, either on 
a state-wide basis or levied by local option in counties or 
towns. Since the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. sec. 
1973H (1970), this practice is no longer valid. 
Fletcher Harper Swift, "Public School Finance," 
Twenty-Five Years of American Education, ed., I. L. Kandel 
(New York: Macmillan, 1924), p. 211. 
49. • ibid., p. 215. cf. also Edgar W. Knight, Fifty Years 
of American Education, 1900-1950 (New York: Ronald Press, 
1952), pp. 319-321. 
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today. Attempts were made up through the mid-1960s, as 
previously stated, to obtain judicial relief from a system 
believed to be unfair, and therefore probably unconstitu­
tional. The courts, however, abstained, demurred, and other­
wise avoided entering the arena of taxing and spending--the 
domain of politics—and thus created the legal stability 
before Serrano. 
Many writers, therefore, advance the idea that the 
change began when the social pressures of the 1960s began to 
meld the concepts of social justice, equality, poverty and 
race into an indefinable potpourri of guilt complexes and 
emotional reactions. Actually a good case can be made for 
attributing the beginnings of the legal foundations to the 
Zeitgeist of that period to the strength of a United States 
. . . 50 Supreme Court decision m 1941. This case introduced the 
modern attitude toward wealth into the courts, and the con­
cepts of wealth and poverty became an increasing factor in 
influencing attitudes in a number of fields—education in­
cluded. 
It can be debated whether or not it was the Great 
Depression which caused an intensification of the attitude 
against wealth in general, but it cannot be denied that the 
ct 0 
Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160 (1941). 
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peril of those times contributed to the suspicion, mistrust 
and overt resentment of the power which wealth commands. 
World War II interrupted the development of the consequences 
of such an emotion by substituting the need for patriotism, 
and the energy of the country and its populace was directed 
towards a pride in overcoming an enemy. Following 1945, 
however, and coexistent with the greatest power the United 
States has ever held, both economically and militarily, 
there arose a growing embarrassment among the opinion makers 
which grew into what was described as a "guilt complex" 
associated with that power. It was a compulsion to distri­
bute the wealth, thus to eradicate some imagined evil, a 
negative greed which was not really generosity but which 
did drive people to the greatest acts of national charitv 
the world has ever seen. This was a new phenomenon and 
not, as some like to believe, an unqualified characteristic 
of the American people. 
It would no doubt shock most Americans to read of the 
earlier intolerance of the United States Supreme Court 
towards the concepts of poverty and paupers. In 1839 it 
was held that it was 
. . . as competent and as necessary for a state to 
provide precautionary measures against the moral pesti­
lence of paupers, vagabonds, and possibly convicts, as 
it is to guard against the physical pestilence, which 
37 
may arise from unsound and infectious articles 
imported.51 
This principle was largely governing until Edwards v. 
California, wherein proceedings were held to test a Cali­
fornia law prohibiting the transportation of "indigent" 
persons into the state. The Court held the law to be an 
unconstitutional burden on interstate commerce. Justice J. 
Byrnes, writing the Opinion of the Court, went on specifi­
cally to reject New York v. Miln, stating that 
Whatever may have been the notion then prevailing 
we do not think that it will now be seriously contended 
that because a person is without employment and without 
funds he constitutes a "moral pestilence."52 
Following the war, the courts again began to be 
buffeted with cases appealed in forma pauperis--where the 
appellant seeks redress at public expense on the plea of 
poverty. Here the subject of wealth--or lack of it--became 
a prime attack on laws which provided procedures to reduce 
what were considered useless expenses. As an illustration, 
California provided that upon filing of an application 
for the appointment of counsel, the District Court of 
Appeals would make 
. . . an independent investigation of the record 
and determine whether it would be of advantage to the 
51 New York v. Miln, 36 U.S. 84 (1837), at 117. 
52314 U.S. 160 (1941) at 176. 
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defendant or helpful to the appellate court to have 
co uns el app oint ed.53 
Even though the intent of such procedures was to protect 
the government, and hence the public, from what was consid­
ered as a frivolous waste, most cases against laws or pro­
cedures of this kind were successful on the grounds that 
the rights of the poor were being infringed and that the 
equal protection provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment 
54 were being denied. 
It can be argued that the success of the weapon of 
poverty in legal matters helped intensify the attack on 
the property tax as a means of financing education. Various 
approaches were used to claim that the equal protection 
guaranteed under the Fourteenth Amendment was being denied. 
Two representative cases came from Chicago, and Bath County, 
Virginia. 
In Illinois, the state imposed limitations on local 
taxes in such a way that poorer school districts were effec­
tively prohibited from spending as much as the wealthier 
ones. Further, there were vast disparities among districts 
53cf. People v. Hyde, 331 P.2d 42 (1958), at 43. 
5 4  . . .  Representative of such cases ares Griffin v. Illi­
nois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956)? Burns v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252 (1959)} 
Smith v. Bennett, 365 U.S. 708 (1961)? Douglas v. California, 
372 U.S. 353 (1963),- Lane v. Brown, 372 U.S. 477 (1963); Gid­
eon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); Draper v. Washington, 
372 U.S. 487 (1963); and Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964). 
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in assessed valuation per pupil. As a consequence, some 
school districts with high tax rates actually spent less on 
education than other districts with lower tax rates. In 
objection to this situation, a suit was brought in Federal 
55 Court, the plaintiffs claiming that their rights under 
the Fourteenth Amendment were violated, and specifically 
asking the court to direct school spending based on a stand­
ard of pupil need under the concept of equal educational 
opportunity. The court refused, basing its decision on 
(1) the opinion that the Fourteenth Amendment does not 
require that public school expenditures be based only on 
pupil needs, and (2) the opinion that equal educational 
opportunity is an imprecise concept and untenable as a legal 
standard. 
The plaintiffs had based their case upon precedents 
. . . . . 56 invalidating racial discrimination m education, geograph-
57 . . ical discrimination m voting, and wealth discrimination 
58 m criminal cases. They maintained that these precedents 
"^Mclnnis v. Shapiro, 293 F.Supp. 327 (1968), aff'd 
sub nom. Mclnnis v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 322 (1969). 
zza 
Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954); 
Griffin v. County School Board, 377 U.S. 218 (1964). 
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962); Reynolds v. 
Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964). 
et o 
Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956); Douglas v. 
California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963); Gideon v. Wainwriqht, 372 
U.S. 335 (1963); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
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had, in effect, established that the present funding system 
constituted discrimination in education, based on account 
of geography and wealth. The court found the argument novel 
X .  4 -  . 5 9  but not.persuasive. 
In the Virginia case,^ certain residents of Bath 
County alleged that the state system of funding education 
invidiously discriminated against them because the county 
is poor. Again, similar to the conditions in the Illinois 
case, the state had limitations on the maximum allowable 
property tax rates. Bath County rates were set at the max­
imum, but due to the county poverty and low tax base, their 
expenditures were restricted. The plaintiffs sought a remedy 
whereby the state would be compelled to assure expenditures 
on the basis of "educational need," and not on local wealth. 
The Court found that the law applied equally to all 
districts, that funds were disbursed by the state under a 
uniform and consistent plan, and that equal protection under 
law was provided. Of perhaps more significance, however, 
was the position taken by the Court on the impreciseness 
^9 The similarity of the arguments by the plaintiffs m 
the Mclnnis case to those used by Arthur E. Wise in Rich 
Schools, Poor Schools (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1968) are remarkable. 
^Burruss v. Wjlkerson, 310 F.Supp. 572 (1969), aff'd 
397 U.S. 44 (1970). 
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of the term "educational need." 
Actually, the plaintiffs seek to obtain allocations 
of State funds among the cities and counties so that the 
pupils in each of them -will enjoy the same educational 
opportunities. This is certainly a worthy aim, commend­
able beyond measure. However, the courts have neither 
the knowledge, nor the means, nor the power to tailor 
the public monies to fit the varying needs of these 
students throughout the state. We can only see to it 
that (state) outlays on one group are not invidiously 
greater or less than on another. No such arbitrariness 
is manifest here.^l 
In these cases the courts were still maintaining an 
air of reluctance to interfere with the political domain of 
taxation and disbursement of public funds. The plaintiffs 
also contributed to the judgments against them by approaching 
the problems with an excess of enthusiasm and too little 
6 2 analysis of possible problems. The nebulous definition 
of educational needs was a major determinant as courts 
turned back their worthy aims, however commendable. 
Opponents of property tax funding methods learned from 
these defeats, and the next round was theirs. 
^Burruss v. Wilkerson, 310 F.Supp. 572 (1969), at 
574. 
6 2 ' For an interesting commentary on this very human 
propensity, see Seymour B. Sarason, The Creation of Settings 
and Future Societies (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1976), 
chapter 1. 
42 
CHAPTER III 
LEGAL ASPECTS OF PUBLIC SCHOOL FINANCING 
The Instability before Serrano 
1968 was a good year for the cause against property 
tax funding. Brown"*" was twelve years old and had assumed 
the strength of an amendment to the Constitution. The 
2 Coleman report was two years old and was being used to 
support all sorts of action, legal and social, against real 
and merely emotional inequalities, de jure and de facto, 
found in our educational systems across the land. Wise 
3 had published the first of the major tenets of the growing 
creed which demanded change from the claimed injustices 
. 4 
resulting from property tax funding of education. Mclnnis 
had been decided unfavorably, true, but it was under appeal. 
Confidence reigned that the wisdom of the United States 
Supreme Court would correct this temporary aberration and 
the natural order would be once more resumed. Substantive 
Brown v. Board' of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
2 James S. Coleman, and others, Equality of Educational 
Opportunity (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1966). 
3 Arthur E. Wise, Rich Schools, Poor Schools (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1968). 
^Mclnnis v. Shapiro, 293 F.Supp. 327 (1968). 
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5 6 7 litigation was filed in Texas, California, and Michigan, 
and more was under way. 
There was confidence among the revisionists as the 
mood of the country seemed to favor change. The student 
revolt had caused a great deal of uncertainty among the 
electorate and the legislators, especially in view of the 
increasing role assumed by the judiciary in matters so 
broad that the United States Supreme Court was accused on 
more than a few occasions of stretching the Constitution 
far beyond the intent of the writers of body and amendments 
alike. The inevitability of change was certainly not a 
novel social phenomena of the year, but it was just as 
certainly a prominent factor—as prominent as it had ever 
been before in history. 
The taxpayer was in a mood for a change, but his 
ideas did not always coincide with the revisionists who, 
5 . . Rodriqnez v. San Antonio Independent School District, 
Civil No. 68-175-SA. 
^Serrano v. Priest, Civil No. 35017, Los Angeles 
County Superior Court. 
7 Board of Education of the School District of the 
City of Detroit v. Michiqan, Civil No. 103342, Wayne County 
Circuit Court (Subsequently dismissed for lack of prosecu­
tion) . 
g 
cf. Raoul Berger, Government by Judiciary (Cambridge; 
Harvard University Press, 1977) for one example of scholarly 
concern in this area. 
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while they fought for a cause they believed would correct 
a situation they held to be unfair, were at the same time 
advocating (as a consequence of their anticipated success) 
an increase in taxes. Most Americans could know instinc­
tively that improving education in poor school districts 
meant higher taxes for all. There certainly was never any 
talk of lowering the quality (and cost) in the better 
schools. No alternatives at all were mentioned—only the 
improvement of the underpriviliged. Taxes were the prin­
cipal cause of the reaction to the continual increase in 
educational programs. No one knew how to curtail the ex­
penditures, but the property owners thought they knew how 
to cut the growth rate, and approvals on school bond issues 
began to be considerably less than enthusiastic. Some 
failed referendum. 
.9 10 When the Supreme Court affirmed Mclnnis and Burruss 
the cause was in no way defeated. Advocates realized that a 
better job would have to be done in the preparation of cases 
and more precision achieved in claims, supportive statements 
and proofs, but success was never doubted. 
Serrano was just the proof needed. The fundamental 
^Aff'd sub nom. Mclnnis v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 322 (1969). 
^^Burruss v. Wilkerson, 397 U.S. 44 (1970). 
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issue in Serrano was a determination of whether or not the 
California system of public school financing, with its 
heavy dependence upon local property taxes and resultant 
disparities in revenues available in individual school 
districts, violated the equal protection provisions of. the 
Fourteenth Amendment. 
The plaintiffs, a group of Los Angeles County public 
school children and their parents, brought a class action 
against the treasurer, the superintendent of public instruc­
tion, and the controller of the state of California; and 
the tax collector and treasurer, and superintendent of 
schools of the county of Los Angeles. The plaintiffs 
sought (l) a declaration of the unconstitutionality of the 
existing financing system; (2) an order directing the re­
allocation of school funds in order to remedy the claimed 
invalidity; and (3) an adjudication that the trial court 
retain jurisdiction to act itself to restructure the system 
if the defendents and the legislature fail to act within a 
reasonable time. 
At the trial court, all of the defendants filed 
general demurrers to the claims, asserting that none of 
the three stated facts were sufficient to constitute a cause 
of action. The trial court sustained the demurrers, giving 
plaintiffs leave to amend. Upon plaintiffs' failure to 
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amend, the defendants moved for a dismissal and the court 
granted the motion. A Court of Appeals decision affirmed 
12 • the dismissal and the action was taken to the California 
Supreme Court. 
By this time the attack on the property tax system 
was well organized. The writings of the triumvirate Coons, 
Clune, and Sugarman, for example, were powerful and had a 
13 strong influence on the California court. They are fre­
quently cited in Serrano, from their devastating critique 
14 of the Mclnnis decision to what became their famous 
"^The foregoing facts are from Serrano v. Priest, 
96 Cal.Rptr. 601, 5 Cal.3d 584, 487 P.2d 1241 (1971). 
1289 CalRptr. 345 (1970), at 351. 
13 Anthony M. Cresswell, "Reforming Public School 
Finance: Proposals and Pitfalls," Teachers College Record, 
73 (May, 1972), 478. 
14 , "The meaning of Mclnnis v. Shapiro is ambiguous* but 
the case hardly seems another Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 
537 (1896). Probably but a temporary setback, it was the 
predictable consequence of an effort to force the court to 
precipitous and decisive action upon a novel and complex 
issue for which neither it nor the parties were ready. . . . 
(T)he plaintiffs' virtual absence of intelligible theory 
left the district court bewildered. Given the pace and char­
acter of the litigation, confusion of the court and parties 
may have been inevitable, foreordaining the summary disposi­
tion of the appeal. The Supreme Court could not have been 
eager to consider an issue of this magnitude on such a rec­
ord. Concededly its per curiam affirmance is formally a 
decision on the merits, but it need not imply the Court's 
permanent withdrawal from the field. It is probably most 
significant as an admonition to the protagonists to clarify 
the options before again invoking the Court's aid." John E. 
Coons, Wm. H. Clune III and S. D. Sugarman, "Educational 
Opportunity: A Workable Constitutional Test for State 
Financial Structures," California Law Review 57 (1969), 308-
309. 
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Proposition I in their book. ' The strength of the book is 
undeniable, even if one disagrees with their logic and their 
conclusions. The concept of the relationship of public 
wealth and education was not originated by them^ but their 
book reemphasized the thought of the time when Cubberley's 
earlier statements had been all but forgotten. 
The Serrano plaintiffs had advanced sufficient "intell­
igible theory" to satisfy the California court. Justice 
Sullivan wrote the Opinion. 
We have determined that this funding scheme 
invidiously discriminates against the poor because it 
makes the quality of a child's education a function of 
the wealth of his parents and neighbors. Recognizing 
as we must that the right to an education in our public 
schools is a fundamental interest which cannot be con­
ditioned on wealth, we can discern no compelling state 
purpose necessitating the present method of financing. 
We have concluded therefore, that such a system cannot 
withstand constitutional challenge and must fail before 
the equal protection clause. 
i 5 
~ John E. Coons, William H. Clune III and Stephen D. 
Sugarman, Private Wealth and Public Education (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1970). 
1 ft 
Cubberley's conclusion that: "... the wealth of the 
state must educate the children of the state," written in 
1909 (see p. 62, Changing Conceptions of Education, cit. 
supra), substantially equates with Coons, and others' Propo­
sition Is . . The quality of public education may not be 
a function of wealth other than the total wealth of the 
state." 0£. cit., p. 304. Wise had been less specific about 
quality when he advocated: "What is clear is that the amount 
of money spent on a child (for education) should not depend 
upon his parents' economic circumstances or his location 
within the state." Arthur E. Wise, "The Constitutional 
Challenge to Inequalities in School Finance," Phi Delta 
Kappan, LI (November, 1969), 145-148. 
1/96 Cal.Rptr. 601 (1971), at 604. 
48 
Justice Sullivan concludeds 
The judgment is reversed and the cause remanded 
to the trial court with directions to overrule the 
demurrers and to allow defendants a reasonable time 
within which to answer.18 
It was a 6 - 1 decision with only Justice McComb dissenting. 
Justice McComb agreed with the 3-0 decision of the Court of 
Appeals, which leaned heavily upon the precedent established 
in Mclnnis. 
Upon remand, the procedures at the trial court, after 
more than 60 days of trial procedings, resulted in a judg­
ment for the plaintiffs and an appeal to the California 
Supreme Court by the defendants. Again Justice Sullivan 
wrote the opinion of the majority (this time 4 - 3), affirm­
ing the judgment of the Los Angeles Superior Court. The 
opinion declared that the state's public school financing 
laws violated the equal protection clause of the California 
Constitution by conditioning the availability of school 
revenues upon the wealth of the school district and by 
making the quality of education dependent upon the level of 
19 expenditure m the district. Serrano II required 29 pages 
to establish the Opinion, and 12 additional pages of dissent. 
^ibid. , at 626. 
^Serrano v. Priest, 135 Cal.Rptr. 345 (1977), at 346. 
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The majority of the court were hampered in their Serrano I 
position which stateds 
Public school financing system which relies 
heavily on local property taxes and causes substantial 
disparities among individual school districts in amount 
of revenue available per pupil for the districts' edu­
cational grants invidiously discriminates against the 
poor and violates the equal protection clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. 20 
In the interim between Serrano I and Serrano II, however, 
The United States Supreme Court had established that educa­
tion is not a fundamental right within the United States 
Constitution and that the Fourteenth Amendment, at least 
where wealth is involved, does not require absolute equality 
21 or precisely equal advantages. This blow to Serrano I 
required that Serrano II be decided solely upon the Cali­
fornia State Constitution, no problem to four of the seven 
Justices. The influence of Coons is found in such state­
ments as s 
Substantial disparities in expenditures per pupil 
among school districts cause and perpetuate substantial 
disparities in the quality and extent of availability 
of educational opportunities.22 
and also in the equivocal admission thats 
Although an equal expenditure level per pupil 
in every district is not educationally sound or 
?o 
96 Cal.Rptr. 601 (1971), at 602. 
^Rodriguez v. San Antonio, 411 U.S. 1 (1973), at 35 
and 24, respectively. 
22135 Cal.Rptr. 345 (1977), at 355. 
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desirable because of differing educational needs, 
equality of educational opportunity requires that all 
school districts possess an equal ability in terms of 
revenue to provide students with substantially equal 
opportunities for learning. 
There is a distinct relationship between cost and 
the quality of educational opportunities afforded. 
Quality cannot be defined wholly in terms of performance 
on state-wide achievement tests because such tests do not 
measure all the benefits and detriments that a child may 
receive from his educational experience. However, even 
using pupil output as a measure of the quality of a 
district's educational program, differences in dollars 
do produce differences in pupil achievement.^3 
Rhetoric of this sort is perhaps allowable in scien­
tific journals and books, but to use such unprovable state­
ments as foundation material in a judicial matter of such 
importance is questionable indeed. Many writers agree with 
Creswell, who puts his objections in these words: 
A definition of educational opportunity in terms 
of dollars must be based on a solid relationship between 
cost and quality. I find, however, no such relationship 
established in Private Wealth and Public Education. 
In fact, evidence to support such an assumption 
is not easy to come by. Some work, including reanalyses 
of the Coleman data, has shown weak relationships between 
categories of school expenditures and achievement scores, 
but the findings are far from conclusive. On the other 
hand, evidence abounds that simply increasing expendi­
tures for educational programs is ineffective. New York 
City schools, for example, have nearly doubled their per 
pupil expenditures in the past ten years while reading 
scores have continued to plummet. Evaluations of Head 
23., . , ibid. 
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Start and Title I (ESEA) programs come up with the same 
discouraging results. Not only are positive results 
hard to find, there is increasing evidence of mismanage­
ment of funds and malfeasance at the local level. In 
short, dollars alone do not create educational opportun­
ity. 24 
The foundation material in Serrano was lengthy. The 
trial produced a 6000 page record and trial briefs hundreds 
2 5  . . .  of pages m length, a full-scale judicial exploration of 
the cost-quality issue. The subject occupied a major portion 
of the Superior Court's opinion. This was expected because 
both sides had argued against the social science tests, in 
essence. The plaintiffs argued against output measuring— 
achievement tests—as being an inappropriate measure of 
educational opportunity. The defendants took the position 
that since achievement testing is the best method presently 
available in measuring educational quality, and since the 
24 Creswell, 0£. cit., p. 479. cf. also Michael J. 
Churgin, Peter H. Ehrenberg, and Peter T. Grossi, Jr., "A 
Statistical Analysis of the School Finance Decisions: On 
Winning Battles and Losing Wars," The Yale Law Journal, 81 
(June, 1972), pp. 1303-1341. In addition, the Coleman 
Report emphasized the point that purchasable educational 
resources produce little impact upon the academic achieve­
ment of students. James S. Coleman, and others, Equality 
of Educational Opportunity (Washington: Government Print­
ing Office, 1966). cf. S. Francis Overlan, "An Equal Chance 
to Learn," New Republic, 166 (May 13, 1972), 19-21, for 
an excellent evaluation of the main Coleman points. 
25 Kenneth L. Karst, "Serrano v. Priest's Inputs and 
Outputs," Law and Contemporary Problems, 38 (Winter-Spring, 
1974), 337. 
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plaintiffs avoided presenting any correlation between unequal 
spending and test scores, the case fails. After reviewing 
the voluminous social science and behaviorist testimony, 
the court saids 
This court is convinced, from the evidence intro­
duced in this case, that the statistical correlation 
reasearch methods employed in. social science or educa­
tional research have not reached that degree of 
reliability that it can be said with any degree of 
certainty as to the precise part which the various 
factors of home, school or genetics play separately 
upon pupil achievement in the standardized reading, 
mathematics, language, or other achievement-measure­
ment tests.26 
In spite of its own admission that no proof was possible, 
the court was 
. . . convinced that a school district's per-pupil 
expenditure level does play a significant role in 
determining whether pupils are receiving a low-quality 
or a high-quality educational program as measured by 
pupil test-score results on the standard achievement 
tests.27 
As one analyst expressed it: 
There is room in the Serrano opinions ... for 
all sorts of differential spending justified by programs 
of compensatory education, experimental programs, in­
creased appropriation to districts with a problem of 
"municipal overburden"—indeed, any inequalities that 
serve compelling state interests, including "local 
control."28 
^Serrano v. Priest, Civil No. 938,254 (Cal.Super.Ct., 
April 10, 1974), at 89. 
27. . ibid. 
28 Karst, op. cit., p, 349. 
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The Aftermath of Serrano 
The Serrano decision brought joy to those who were 
opponents of local funding of school districts. They were 
not concerned with what the decision did not do. They 
listened only to the negative standard produced by the 
court: the quality of a child's education may not be a 
"function of wealth of ... (a pupil's) parents and neigh-
29 . bors." They gave this principle the name of "fiscal 
neutrality," and it was a standard of measurement which 
could be applied anywhere. Here was no vague statement 
30 . . 31 
about "educational needs," or "educational opportunities." 
Wealth was easy to measure and to compare. 
There was fear in many, however, that full state fund­
ing would destroy even the little local autonomy which the 
, , 32 community schools had remaining. Undaunted by this, how­
ever, the reform advocates seized the standard of "fiscal 
neutrality" provided by Serrano and headed for trial courts 
^Serrano v. Priest, 96 Cal.Rptr. 601 (1971), at 604. 
"^McJnnis v. Shapiro, 293 F.Supp. 327 (1968), at 331, 
335. 
^Burruss v. Wilkerson, 310 F.Supp. 572 (1969), at 
574. 
3 2  . . .  B. Levin, "School Finance Reform m a Post-Rodriguez 
World," Contemporary Legal Problems in Education (Topeka, 
Kansass The National Organization on Legal Problems of 
Education, 1974), p. 158. 
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3 3  . 3 4  all over the land. Between Serrano and the Rodriguez 
decisions, there were filed in 31 states no less than 52 
35 • actions. In that period, and of the fifty-two cases, 
nine decisions were given, seven favorable to the Serrano 
position, and two opposing it. 
But a jarring note of reality crept through the emotion 
of fiscal neutrality. In collecting and preparing data to 
defend their court actions, reformers came across some start­
ling data which ran counter to their beliefs. Districts with 
the highest tax bases per pupil were found not to be the 
wealthy, affluent, conservative suburbs, but rather were the 
3 G 
big inner-city systems with industrial and commercial bases. 
Researchers found per pupil wealth to be $48,837 in the 
central cities, exceeding the suburban average by about 35 
37 per cent and rural averages by 77 per cent. The Urban 
^Serrano v. Priest, 96 Cal.Rptr. 601 (1971). 
"^Rodriguez v. San Antonio, 411 U.S. 1 (1973). 
3 5  .  . . .  Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law, 
"Intra-state School Finance Court Cases," (Washington: 
Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law, 1972). This 
report was subsequently revised in 1976 as "Update on State­
wide School Finance Cases. School Finance Project." 
ED 119 299, January, 1976. 
3 6 B. Levin, Thomas Muller, William J. Scanlon, and 
others, Public School Financet Present Disparities and 
Fiscal Alternatives, (Report prepared by the Urban Institute 
for the President's Commission on School Finance, 1972). 
37. . ibid., p. 53. 
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Coalition found that a shift to a uniform state-wide tax 
would disadvantage schools in 25 out of 34 major cities. 
Calculations showed that even the district power equalizing 
plan advocated by Coons would hurt most city schools just as 
O O 
much. Very quickly the enthusiasm for property tax 
reform began to wane. 
The Nixon Administration had proposed a national Value 
Added Tax, a sort of national hidden sales tax, which would 
effect a very quiet devaluation of the dollar. Congress 
was understandably at this time cold to the idea, and the 
proposal was abandoned, as well as federal proposals for 
property tax relief which were to be financed by the Value 
Added Tax. Voters in both California and Oregon voted 
down proposals for abandoning the local property tax. Even 
Orange County in California (the locale for Serrano) pre-
39 
ferred the trouble it had to that of an untested alternative. 
As Areen and Ross commented: 
. . . one could argue, if the property tax were 
so unpopular it wouldn't have survived so long. Its 
very inelasticity—its built-in resistance to rapid 
expansion—may have endeared it to a tax-weary elec­
torate.^ 
38 Judith Areen and Leonard Ross, 'The Rodriguez Cases 
Judicial Oversight of School Finance," The Supreme Court 
Review 33 (1973), p. 35. 
40 CO ibid., p. 50. 
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Rodriguez and the United States Constitution 
In the summer of 1968 a group of Mexican-American 
parents filed a class action suit against the Texas system 
of financing public education. In that state the so-called 
state-aid program—funds from general revenues—financed 
approximately one-half of all public expenditures. These 
state-aid funds were distributed according to a fairly 
complicated formula, but one which was designed to have an 
equalizing influence on expenditures among the school dis­
tricts. Approximately forty per cent of education expendi­
tures were raised by local property taxation and the balance 
was provided from federal funds. 
As in Serrano, the plaintiffs held that the system 
favored the more affluent and violated the equal protection 
requirements of the United States Constitution. The trial 
was delayed for two years, 
. . . to permit extensive pretrial discovery and to 
allow completion of a pending Texas legislative 
investigation concerning the need for reform of its 
public school finance system.41 
In December, 1971, the three-judge court rendered its 
decision in a per curiam decision holding the Texas school 
finance system to be unconstitutional under the Equal 
41 
411 U.S. 1 (1973), at 6, n. 4. 
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42 Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The state 
appealed, and on 21 March 1973 Justice Powell delivered the 
. . 43 Opinion of the Supreme Court. 
The decision reflected the diversity of opinion 
rampant among the political and educational leaders in 
the country. In a five-to-four decision, the Court rejected 
a constitutional challenge to the property tax method of 
school finance. In finding the Texas system of public 
school finance to be not unconstitutional, the court con­
sidered three major aspects of the "equal protection" 
challenge. 
(1) Was the relationship between district wealth and 
school expenditures tantamount to a "suspect classification" 
whereby an identifiable body of students was subject to 
discrimination? The Court first disposed of the question 
of the "identifiable body." Citing Churgin, Ehrenberg and 
. 4 4  Grossi, the Court pointed out that there is a reason to 
believe that the poorest families are not necessarily 
clustered in the poorest property districts and that they 
frequently are found clustered around commercial and indus­
trial areas—those same areas that provide the most 
42 Rodriguez v. San Antonio School District, 337 
F.Supp. 280 (1971). 
43411 U.S. 1 (1973). 
44 op. cit. 
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attractive sources of property tax income for school dis-
45 tricts. The Opinion went on to state that: 
Apart from the unsettled and disputed question 
whether the quality of education may be determined by 
the amount of money expended for it, a sufficient 
answer to appellees' argument is that, at least where 
wealth is involved, the Equal Protection Clause does 
not require absolute equality or precisely equal 
advantages.46 
After a brief reanalysis of the Texas "Minimum Foun-
47 dation Program of Education," the Court reemphasized that 
in 
. . . the absence of any evidence that the financing 
system discriminates against any definable category of 
"poor" people or that it results in the absolute depri­
vation of education—the disadvantaged class is not 
susceptible of identification in traditional terms. ° 
(2) In the second phase of the plaintiffs' challenge, 
the Court examined whether the system of Texas school finance 
was compatible with a "legitimate state purpose." Here the 
Court found that the usage of local property taxation was 
rationally related to the state's avowed desire to encourage 
local interest and participation in the concerns of the 
school district. Justice Powell wrote that: 
45411 U.S. 1 (1973), at 23. 
4f> 
ibid., at 23-24. 
4 7  . . . . .  Which program had been considered m detail, ibid., 
at 6 through 17. 
48. . ibid., at 25. 
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. . . if local taxation for local expenditures were 
an unconstitutional method of providing for education 
then it might be an equally impermissible means of 
providing other necessary services customarily financed 
largely from local property taxes, including local 
police and fire protection, public health and hospitals, 
and public utility facilities of various kinds.^9 
And furthers 
The Texas plan is not the result of hurried, ill-
conceived legislation. It certainly is not the product 
of purposeful discrimination against any group or class. 
On the contrary, it is rooted in decades of experience 
in Texas and elsewhere, and in major part is the product 
of responsible studies by qualified people. 
i • » 
In its essential characteristics, the Texas plan 
for financing public education reflects what many 
educators for a half a century have thought was an 
enlightened approach to a problem for which there is 
no perfect solution. 
t • • 
The constitutional standard under the Equal Pro­
tection Clause is whether the challenged state action 
rationally furthers a legitimate state purpose or 
interest. We hold that the Texas plan abundantly 
satisfies this standard. 
(3) The third question, possibly the most far-reaching, 
was whether ot not education is a "fundamental interest" in 
the eyes of the Constitution. The Court reaffirmed its 
"historic dedication to public education," but refused to 
find, either explicitly or implicitly, that education is 
among the fundamental rights protected by the Constitution. 
49. 
•* ibid. , at 54. 
~^ibid. , at 55 . 
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We are in complete agreement with the conclusion 
of the Three-panel below that "the grave significance 
of education both to the individual and to our society" 
cannot.be doubted. But the importance of a service 
performed by the State does not determine whether it 
must be regarded as fundamental for purposes of exam­
ination under the Equal Protection Clause.51 
i « • 
It is not the province of this Court to create 
substantive constitutional rights in the name of 
guaranteeing equal protection of the laws. . . . 
Rather the answer lies in assessing whether there is 
a right to education explicitly or implicitly guaran­
teed by the Constitution. 
Education, of course, is not among the rights 
afforded explicit protection under our Federal Consti­
tution. Nor do we find any basis for saying it is 
implicitly so protected.52 
As stated by Areen and Ross: 
Although the Court conceded some plausibility 
to the argument that education was fundamental because 
it was related to the right to vote, the argument was 
rejected on the ground that it proved too much.53 
It was this proof, rejected in the Opinion of the Court, 
which constituted the bulk of the 67-page dissent by Justice 
Thurgood Marshall, who was absent during the oral argument 
54 of the case. It was stated early m this dissent that it 
~^ibid., at 30. 
52ibid. , at 33,' 35. 
53 Judith Areen and Leonard Ross, "The Rodriguez Cases 
Judicial Oversight of School Finance," The Supreme Court 
Review, 33 (1973), p. 37. 
54 Mark G. Yudof and Daniel C. Morgan, "Rodriguez v. 
San Antonio Independent School District; Gathering the 
Ayes of Texas—The Politics of School Finance Reform," Law 
and Contemporary Problems, LXXXVIII (Winter-Spring, 1974), 
p. 401. 
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is his opinion that 
. . . the right of every American to an equal start 
in life, so far as the provision of a state service 
as important as education is concerned, is . . . 
vital . .55 
While it is difficult to disagree with such a statement, 
it is even more difficult to arrive at a viable procedure 
which will provide this "right" if it exists. For a state 
to provide an equal start in life to each individual, the 
education would have to be individually (and therefore 
unequally) provided in order to overcome the variances in 
need provided by "home, school, or genetics," which the 
Serrano trial court had specified in its rejection of the 
56 absolute m educational research. The inherent monumental 
difficulty, if not impossibility, in providing such equality 
makes the naming of it as a "right" extremely tenuous. 
Robinson and State Constitutions 
From Rodriguez to Robinson took less than two weeks. 
Where Rodriguez seemed to restrict the way to school finance 
5 7  . . .  reform, Robinson opened new doors. The suit was filed m 
the Superior Court, Hudson County, New Jersey, early in 
1970. The plaintiffs charged that the New Jersey system 
55411 U.S. 1 (1973), at 71. 
^Serrano v. Priest, Civil No. 938,254 (Cal. Super. Ct. , 
April 10, 1974),—at-8"9~! 
"^Robinson v. Cahill, 303 A.2d 273 (1973). 
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of financing public schools was unconstitutional under both 
the New Jersey and United States Constitutions for reasons 
that it made the quality of education dependent upon the 
wealth of each respective district, that the schools were 
not being maintained thoroughly and efficiently as required 
by the State Constitution, and that the system provided 
racial discrimination. They asked the court to declare the 
system unconstitutional, to order the restructuring of the 
system to change district boundary lines to equalize the 
58 tax base per student ratios. 
Trial was not held until late 1971, and on 19 January 
1972 the court decided that the school finance system in 
New Jersey did violate the education clause of the State 
Constitution and the provision requiring uniformity of 
taxation, and also denied the plaintiffs equal protection 
59 of the laws under both the State and Federal Constitutions. 
The education clause in question was a provision in an 1875 
amendment to the New Jersey Constitution which commands the 
Legislature to provide a "thorough and efficient system of 
free public schools. 
cr o 
cf., Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law, 
Update on State-wide School Finance Cases, (Washington! 
Lawyers* Committee for Civil Rights Under Law, January, 1976), 
p. 7. 
^Robinson v. Cahill, 287 A.2d 187 (1972). 
6 0 
Constitution of the State of New Jersey, Article 
VIII, sec. 4, para. 1. 
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On appeal to the New Jersey Supreme Court, the decision 
invalidating the state's school finance system was affirmed 
unanimously on the basis of the "thorough and efficient" 
clause, finding discrepancies in dollar input per pupil.^ 
Disagreeing with the trial court, the supreme court found 
the case to be inappropriate for decision on federal and 
6 2 state equal protection grounds. 
The court found that, unlike the Texas system, the 
New Jersey State aid did not operate substantially to equal-
0 3 ize the sum available per pupil, and stated in rather con­
clusive terms (but with no supportive citatiuns) that although 
the court recognized that equality of dollar input would not 
assure equality of results, "the quality of educational 
opportunity does depend in substantial measure upon the 
64 number of dollars invested." 
The court, while basing its affirmation on the basis of 
the "thorough and efficient" clause, left to others the task 
of giving detailed content to these words. The court recog­
nized the temporal nature of the meaning, contrasting the 
1970s against the 1890s when only elementary school education 
^Robinson v. Cahill, 303 A. 2d 273 (1973), at 295. 
62ibid., at 283-287. 
^ibid. , at 277. 
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was provided. "Today, a system of public education which 
did not offer high school education would hardly be thor-
65 ough and efficient." The court further buttressed this 
position by advancing the opinion thats 
The Constitution's guarantee must be understood 
to embrace that educational opportunity which is needed 
in the contemporary setting to equip a child for his 
role as a citizen and as a competitor in the labor 
market.66 
This matter of the meaning of "thorough and efficient" 
requires some analysis in order to define the depth of the 
Robinson decision. After the decision and in a hearing the 
court set 31 December 1974 as a deadline by which the legis­
lature was to act in an appropriate manner to remedy the 
unconstitutional aspects of the school financing system. 
On 23 January 1975, the court recognized that no such 
legislation had been enacted and said that; "The matter now 
returns to the court for the ordering of the appropriate 
6 V remedies to effectuate the court's original decision." 
The court scheduled a hearing for 18 March 1975. The first 
question to be considered was that of a definition of a 
"thorough and efficient system of free public schools." 
65ibid., at 295 
6 6 . ,  •  -ibid. 
^Robinson v. Cahill, 335 A.2d 6 (1975), at 6. 
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The second question was to be the translation of the defi­
nition into fiscal terms. The responses of all concerned, 
plaintiffs, defendants, and amici curiae illustrate the 
complexity and difficulty of the problem. 
(1) The New Jersey Attorney General proposed "process 
standards," a system whereby the local districts, using some 
formula to be established by the State Department of Educa­
tion, would translate its needs into educational objectives 
or standards. This was criticized on the grounds that (a) 
it did not provide state-wide standards of educational 
quality, and (b) "process standards" did not meet the 
court's requirement of the application of equal educational 
opportunity to the entire state. 
(2) The Governor endorsed the "process standards," 
suggesting that all funds from the six areas of existing 
state aid be distributed through a district power equali­
zation formula—named the Bateman formula. This was 
criticized because low wealth districts would receive sub­
stantial financial "windfalls" and other districts suffer 
considerable losses. 
(3) The plaintiffs agreed with the Governor, but con­
centrated their comments on the "thorough and efficient" 
problem. They claimed that "thorough and efficient" was a 
very fluid concept, definable only in the context of a given 
66 
6 8 situation at a given time. They advocated a "controlled 
experimentation with process standards." 
(4) The American Civil Liberties Union and the National 
Association for the Advancement of Colored People proposed 
that both the equal educational opportunity could be defined 
and the "thorough and efficient" requirement satisfied by 
using a state-wide assessment program coupled with the use of 
a competency based education program. 
(5) The New Jersey Education Reform Project proposed 
that the concept of "thorough and efficient" would be satis­
fied in terms of the basic skills of reading, writing and 
mathematics. 
As Salmon and Alexander sum it: 
After hearing arguments it would appear that the 
Supreme Court of New Jersey had made very little pro­
gress on its journey down the misty judicial road of 
school finance to a poorly delineated destination of 
defining "thorough and efficient," In addition to the 
court's rather vague interpretation of "thorough and 
efficient" it had the equally vague and conflicting 
opinions of the plaintiff, defendants, and amici 
curiae.^9 
A danger here would be in assuming that this problem 
of vagueness of two words completely debilitates the 
6 8 For a very good analysis of this and other aspects of 
this hearing, see R. G. Salmon and M. D. Alexander, "The 
Concept of 'Thorough and Efficient': A Problem of Definition. 
ED 123 734, 1976. 
69. . 
ibid., p. 19. 
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strength of the Robinson case so as to make it useless. 
Robinson is an extremely complex case from the legal stand­
point. If it did nothing else, Robinson illustrates the 
difficulty which arises from legislation which is either 
imprecisely stated, or stated in general terms which can 
be interpreted in various ways. The intent of legislators 
fades with time unless it is precisely expressed. An 
example of this, related to the specific issue of "thorough 
and efficient" in the New Jersey Constitution, is cited by 
Tractenbergs 
A participant in the 1947 Constitutional Conven­
tion, which carried forward the 1875 education clause, 
informally expressed the view that the intent of the 
Convention was not to create a justiciable issue when­
ever a student alleged that he or she had been denied 
a "thorough and efficient" education. Rather, the 
clause was intended as a mandate to the legislature 
to take necessary action. The implication, presumably, 
was that the legislature, and not the courts, should 
determine finally whether the mandate had been met. 
Some states have constructed their education clauses 
in this manner. Others, including New Jersey, have 
ultimate power in the judiciary to determine the 
sufficiency of legislative action.70 
The Robi ns on court went to great lengths to investigate 
the problem of "thorough and efficient" and, failing to find 
anything but conflict,' took some courageous steps to fill the 
need. It established that: "Thorough and efficient means 
70 Paul L. Tractenberg, "Robinson v. Cahill% The 
'Thorough and Efficient' Clause," Law and Contemporary 
Problems, 38 (Winter-Spring, 1974), p. 325, n. 82. 
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more than adequate or minimal." "" It then declared an 
extremely controversial tenet that "there is a significant 
connection between the sums expended and the quality of 
72 educational opportunity." 
Having gone this far, the court also rejected the 
extremists in the reform movement by allowing for differ­
ences by local option: "Nor do we say that if the State 
assumes the cost of providing the constitutionally mandated 
education, it may not authorize local government to go 
•—l o 
further."7 It was thus the position of the court that 
even if "thorough" was not the most complete education 
possible, the standard established by the word was, of 
necessity, high, and also sufficient to the needs of the 
times. The court cited Landis v. Ashworth with approval. 
Nor can I think that the constitution requires the 
legislature to provide the same means of instruction 
for every child in the state. A scheme to accomplish 
that result would compel either the abandonment of all 
public schools designed for the higher education of 
youth or the establishment of such schools in every 
section of the state within reach of daily attendance 
by all children there residing. Neither of these 
consequences was contemplated by the amendment of 1875. 
Its purpose was to impose on the legislature a duty of 
providing for a thorough and efficient system of free 
schools, capable of affording to every child such 
^Robinson v. Cahill, 287 A. 2d 187 (1972), at 187, 
72303 A.2d 273 (1973), at 277. 
^^ibid., at 298. 
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instruction as is necessary to fit it for the ordinary 
duties of citizenship; and such provision our school 
laws would make, if properly executed, with the view 
of- securing the common rights of all before tendering 
peculiar advantages to any. But, beyond this consti­
tutional obligation, there still exists the power of 
the legislature to provide, either directly or indirectly, 
•' in its discretion, for the further instruction of youth 
in such branches of learning as, though not essential, 
are yet conducive to the public service. On this power, 
I think, rest the laws under which special opportunities 
for education at public expense are enjoyed.^ 
The court also found itself in a controversial ambi­
guity when it declared: 
. . . it cannot be said the 1875 amendments were 
intended to insure statewide equality among taxpayers. 
But we do not doubt that an equal educational oppor­
tunity for children was precisely in mind. The mandate 
that there be maintained and supported "a thorough and 
efficient system of free public schools for the instruc­
tion of all children in the State between the ages^of 
five and eighteen years" can have no other import.75 
The term "equal educational opportunity" is as difficult to 
7 6 define as "thorough and efficient." The approach used by 
the court may have been a deliberate attempt to avoid a 
rigidly based standard of specified input, output, process, 
or method. The proof of the educational system must be 
whether the constitutionally mandated basic, but high level, 
education available to students throughout the state was. 
likely to produce the desired outcome—to permit students 
/431 A. 1017 (1895), at 1018. 
^Robinson v. Cahill, 303 A.2d 273 (1973), at 294. 
/0A good analysis is in Arthur E. Wise, "Legal Chal­
lenges to Public School Finance, " School Review, LXXXII 
(November, 1973), pp. 19-20. 
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to achieve the capacity to function as productive citizens. 
The Robinson decision provides no handbook solution 
to school finance problems, not even yet in the state of 
New Jersey. The alternative forms of taxation and distri­
bution of funds will be tested for many years. But the 
decision is a powerful one, both in its strengths and its 
weaknesses. As summed by Tractenbergs 
The New Jersey Supreme Court's decision in Robin­
son should provide the impetus for long-overdue reform 
of educational finance, education itself, and perhaps 
ultimately, of the way in which the entire range of 
governmental services are provided. At least, by its 
willingness to begin entertaining issues of fundamental 
importance to the structure of the state and local 
government, the court has created a powerful inducement 
for responsible legislative and executive action. One 
can only hope that legislators in New Jersey and other 
states will seize the initiative from the courts and 
develop the lasting and comprehensive reform which they 
are best constituted to provide.^7 
78 On 23 May 1975, the court gave its opinion based 
79 on the 18 March hearing and the previous rulings. Here 
the court proposed a provisional solution, warning that the 
provisional plan should not be misconstructed as a permanent, 
satisfactory mandate. The problem for solution still rested 
with the state legislature. In September 1975, the 
77 op. cit., p. 332 
70 
Robinson v. Cahill, 339 A.2d 193 (1975). 
79 
Including? 287 A.2d 187 (1972); supplemented in 
289 A.2d (1972); aff'd as modified 303 A.2d 273 (1973); 
supplemented in 306 A.2d 65 (1973); supplemented in 335 
A.2d 6 (1975); supplemented 67 N.J. 333 (1975). 
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legislature passed and the governor signed S. 1516 into law, 
The Public School Education Act of 1975. 
The Robinson plaintiffs, not satisfied with this act, 
claimed that it did not comply with the instructions of the 
court. The plaintiffs filed suit on the grounds that (1) the 
Act did not define the term "thorough and efficient," (2) 
the Act was not funded by the legislature, and (3) the Act, 
if funded, would operate to continue the inequities between 
the suburban school districts and the urban districts. 
On 30 January 1976, the court held the Act constitu­
tional on its face, provided it be funded.^ The court with­
held final approval, however, until the Act had been tested in 
practice. After the 30 January opinion, Governor Bateman 
suggested to the court that the legislature may not provide 
the necessary funds, and the court responded with an order 
to show cause why certain remedies should not be ordered by 
the court if the funds were not provided by the legislature. 
On 13 May 1976, after another hearing, the supreme 
court enjoined all state and local officials from spending 
any funds for the support of the public schools, effective 
1 July, unless the legislature should act to find the Act 
81 fully for the coming school year. x The schools were closed 
o n 
Robinson v. Cahill, 355 A.2d 12S (1976). 
^Robinson v. Cahi 11, 35 3 A. 2d 457 (1976). 
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for two weeks following 1 July after which the legislature 
passed a state income tax bill for the purpose of fully 
funding the Act. The injunction was lifted. 
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CHAPTER IV 
ANALYSIS OF MAJOR COURT DECISIONS IN THE 
AREA OF PUBLIC SCHOOL FINANCE 
In a surge of Serrano-generated enthusiasm, the reform 
advocates instituted a surfeit of anti-property-tax cases 
throughout the nation. Many of these cases were abandoned, 
simply not prosecuted, for various reasons. Others were 
decided in state courts and considered to be of such little 
general influence in the scheme of the property-tax battle 
that they are not even given space in the usual Reporter 
System. 
The cases selected here for analysis are the major 
decisions in both state and federal courts. Their influence 
is felt in the three "landmark" cases discussed in Chapter 
III—Serrano, Rodriguez and Robinson. They are illustrative 
of the fine constitutional lines drawn by the different 
courts, emphasizing the substance of both rights and respon­
sibilities, and of ideals and practical limitations. Collec­
tively, the effect is that of a very fine tapestry. 
Arizona 
Hoi1ins v. Shofstall, 515 P.2d 590 (1973). 
On 12 October 1971, a group of public school students 
from Maricopa County, Arizona, and their parents filed a suit 
74 
claiming (1) that the Arizona state system of public school 
financing was unconstitutional in that it discriminated 
against the taxpaying parents, violating the state and 
federal constitution equal protection clauses, and (2) that 
the system also provided for unconstitutional injury and 
inequality in the right of the students to an education. 
The Arizona Superior Court for Maricopa County granted a 
summary judgment for the taxpayer plaintiffs but denied the 
motion of the students."'" In an attempt to allow the state 
legislature time to remedy the situation, the court ordered 
that its declaratory judgment for,the taxpayers would not 
take effect until after the close of the 1974 session of 
the legislature. 
On 2 November 1973, the Arizona Supreme Court, on 
appeal, reversed the lower court and remanded the case for 
further proceedings. The Supreme Court of Arizona held that 
the state "Constitution does establish education as a funda-
2 mental right of pupils between the ages 6: and 21 years," 
but maintained that the applicable standard to judge the 
constitutionality of the Arizona system of school finance 
was whether it has a "rational and reasonable basis . . . 
"^Hollins v. Shof stall, Civ. No. C-253652 (Ariz. Super, 
ct., June 1, 1972). 
2Hollins v. Shofstall, 515 P.2d 590 (1973) at 592. 
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which meets the educational mandates of the . . . consti-
3 . tution." The Court further maintained that the Arizona 
school finance system did meet that standard, despite the 
fact that some districts had a greater tax burden than others, 
stating that it found "no magic in the fact that the school 
district taxes herein complained of are greater in some 
districts than others."' 
On 1 July 1974, an entirely new school financing 
statutory framework became effective as a result of legis-
. . 5 lative action m the 1973 session. 
Connecticut 
Horton v. Meski11, 332 A.2d 813 (1974), 376 A.2d 359 
(1977) . 
In the town of Canton a group of school children sought 
a declaratory judgment to determine whether the Connecticut 
system of financing public schools was in violation of either 
the United States Constitution or the Connecticut Constitu­
tion. They claimed that the state had been derelict in its 
duty, specified in Article 8, section 1, of the State Consti­
tution, which states: "There shall always be free elementary 
and secondary schools in the State. The general assembly 
^ibid., at 592,and 593. 
^ibid., at 593. 
r-
^Arizona laws 1973, Chapter 182, section 13. 
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shall implement this principle by appropriate legislation." 
The Connecticut system, in total, was financed by local 
taxes for approximately three-quarters of the educational 
expenditures and the rest by state and federal aid, the lat­
ter being about three per cent. The state aid was distrib­
uted as a flat grant per pupil, but because of wide ranges 
of property valuations among the school districts, educa­
tional expenditures were largely a function of geography and 
local wealth. 
On 26 December 1974, the Superior Court of Hartford 
County issued a memorandum decision holding that the Connect­
icut system violated the equal protection clause of the State 
but not the Federal Constitution. The court maintained that 
although the duty of educating children has been dele­
gated by statute to municipalities, both the common law 
of this state and the Connecticut Constitution provide 
that the duty of educating Connecticut children is upon 
the state, as a whole and not upon its municipalities.^ 
Further, the court maintained that legislation for financing 
education which depended on local property wealth was not 
"appropriate" as stipulated in Article 8, section 1. The 
court denied any justification of the system on the grounds 
7 that it served the objective of local control. 
The court also held education to be a "fundamental 
6Horton v. Meskill, 332 A.2d 133 (1974) at 116. 
7. . ibid., at 119. 
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interest" in the State even though admitting that "the 
Connecticut constitution does not declare in haec verba that 
g 
education is a fundamental right." 
Another admission of consequence is that: 
The court is not unmindful of the testimony that 
there is no conclusive evidence that there is a correla­
tion between education input . . . and education output. 
. . . On the other hand, the evidence in this case is 
highly persuasive that, all other variables being con­
stant, there is a high correlation between education 
input and education opportunity (the range and quality 
of educational services offered to pupils). In other 
words, disparities in expenditure per pupil tend to 
result in disparities in education opportunity.® 
The court granted no injunctive relief, but retained 
jurisdiction over the case. On 19 April 1977, the Supreme 
Court of Connecticut upheld the decision. 
Florida 
Hargrave v. Kirk, 413 F.2d 320 (1969), 313 F.Supp. 944 
(1970), vacated sub nom. Askew v. Hargrave, 401 U.S. 476 
(1971). 
The plaintiffs were a group of resident parents and 
students from sixteen counties in Florida. They brought the 
suit (in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of 
Florida) challenging a 1968 law in Florida, the Millage Roll­
back Law, as violative of the Equal Protection Clause of the 
ibid. 
9 11 i , ibid. 
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Fourteenth Amendment on the ground that the law invidiously 
discriminated in effect in its distribution of taxing author­
ity for educational purposes by a standard related solely to 
a county's wealth. The District Court dismissed the case and 
the Court of Appeals remanded with directions to convene a 
three-judge court. 
The law involved was enacted by the legislature to 
provide for the financing of public schools through state 
appropriations and local ad valorem taxes assessed by each 
school district. One section of the law provided that, to 
be eligible to receive state aid under this law, a school 
district must limit ad valorem taxes for school purposes to 
not more than ten mills of assessed valuation. 
The three-judge court, on cross motions for summary 
judgment, held that the law was a violation of the equal 
protection clause. 
In a broader view, the United States Supreme Court 
vacated the judgment of the district court, citing that the 
plea was inadequate as a basis for deciding the equal pro­
tection claim in that it ignored the fact that the Millage 
Rollback law was 
. . . only one aspect of a comprehensive legislative 
"*"^Sub nom. Hargrave v. McKinney, 413 F.2d 3 20 (1969). 
"^Hargrave v. Kirk, 313 F.Supp. 944 (1970). 
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program for reorganizing educational financing through­
out the State to more nearly equalize educational ^2 
opportunities for all the school children of the State. 
The Court went on to quote, with favor, from the defendants' 
position: 
The net effect of the 1968 educational financing 
enactments was not only to make up for the loss of funds 
suffered by the counties required to reduce local mi11age 
but to greatly increase the moneys available to the 
counties on a per pupil basis.1-1 
This decision was not enthusiastically supported by everyone. 
As Salmon and Alexander somewhat wryly noted, the Court 
authorized a program which provided that equality can be 
attained by permitting local school districts to tax them­
selves at levels sufficiently high to offset any existing 
1 4  wealth differences. 
Idaho 
Thompson v. Enqelkinq, 537 P,2d 635 (1975). 
Article 9, Section 1 of the Idaho Constitution states: 
The stability of a republican form of government 
depending mainly upon the intelligence of the people, it 
shall be the duty of the legislature of Idaho to estab­
lish and maintain a general, uniform and thorough system 
of public, free common schools. 
A group of school children and their parents residing 
Askew v. Hargrave, 401 U.S. 476 (1971 ) at 479. 
13.-, . , ibid. 
la 
~R. G, Salmon and M. D. Alexander, "The Concept of 
'Thorough and Efficient': A Problem of Definition," 
ED 123 734, 1976. 
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in Pocatello School District No. 25 brought suit against the 
school system in Idaho based upon the equal protection pro­
visions of the Idaho Constitution, and upon the education 
provisions of Article 9, section 1. On 16 November 1973, a 
trial court issued a written opinion declaring the state's 
school financing system to be unconstitutional and ordering 
a restructuring of the system so as to provide equal expend­
itures per pupil. 
On appeal, the Idaho Supreme Court reversed the trial 
court, 
. . . after a careful analysis of our Constitution, the 
circumstances surrounding its adoption, and the long 
line of cases in which this Court has adjudicated 
questions relating to our system of public schools 
and to its financing.15 
The Court refused to recognize education as a funda­
mental interest,^ and dismissed the equal protection clause 
17 claims of the plaintiffs as well. One of the arguments 
used by the court in support of the Opinion regarding equal 
18 
protection was taken from a 195 2 case in the same court. 
Traditionally, not only in Idaho but throughout 
most of the states of the Union, the legislature has 
left the establishment, control and management of the 
school to the parents and taxpayers in the community 
which it serves. The local residents organized the 
15Thompson v. Engelkincr, 537 P.2d 635 (1975) at 641. 
16ibid., at 647. 
17ibid., at 640-645. 
18Andrus v. Hill, 249 P.2d 205 (1952). 
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school district pursuant to enabling legislation, imposed 
taxes upon themselves, built their own school house, 
elected their own trustees and through them managed their 
own school. It was under these circumstances that the 
"Little Red School House" became an American institution, 
the center of community life, and a pillar in the Ameri­
can conception of freedom in education, and in local con­
trol of institutions of local concern. In the American 
concept, there is no greater right to the supervision 
of the education of the child than that of the parent. 
In no other hands could it be safer. 
The American people made a wise choice early in 
their history by not only creating forty-eight state 
system(s) of education but also by retaining within the 
community, close to parental observation, the actual 
direction and control of the educational program. This 
tradition of community administration is a firmly accept­
ed and deeply rooted policy.-®-® 
Illinois 
People of the State of Illinois ex. rel, Jones v. 
Adams, 350 N.E.2d 767 (1976). 
A group of landowners and parents of school children in 
Franklin County., Illinois, paid their property taxes in 1971 
and 1972 under protest. They claimed that farmers, under 
the Illinois school financing system 
. . . are denied equal protection of the laws by the levy­
ing of burdensome real estate taxes upon their farms, and 
that the parents of school-aged children who reside in 
poor school districts are denied equal protection of the 
laws . . . in violation of the fourteenth amendment to 
the United States Constitution and Article I, sec. 2 cf 
the 1970 Illinois Constitution.20 
^^ibid., at 207. 
n Q 
^ People of the State of Illinois ex. rel. Jones v 
Adams, 350 N.E.2d 767 (1976) at 768. 
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The Circuit Court of Franklin County overruled the 
landowners' objections and on 9 July 1976, the Appellate 
Court of Illinois, Fifth District, affirmed the decision. 
The Court disposed of the arguments respecting the 
method of taxing and the property tax multipliers in question 
and then proceeded to a novel interpretation of the Rodriguez 
, • . 21 decision. 
Although the United States Supreme Court purported 
to apply, in Rodriguez, the standard of review ordinarily 
used in equal protection cases, it actually fashioned 
another standard which is more restrictive than the 
ordinary standard, but less restrictive than the standard 
of strict judicial scrutiny.22 
Under this intermediate standard, the court concluded that 
. . . a state's method of financing public schools might 
deny children in expecially poor school districts the 
equal protection of the laws, and yet might be constitu­
tional with respect to children in other school dis­
tricts . 23 
Nevertheless, the court found that 
The burden of demonstrating, by evidence and rea­
soned argument, that the discrimination against parents 
and school children residing in a poor school district 
is invidious, must fall upon the parties who attack the 
discrimination. In the present case, the defendants 
have failed to carry this burden.24 
^Rodriguez v. San Antonio, 411 U.S. 1 (1973). 
22 People of the State of Illinois ex. rel. Jones v. 
Adams, 350 N.E.2d 767 (1976) at 776. 
23. . ibid. 
2 4 ,  ibid. 
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Indiana 
Jenson v. Board of Tax Commissioners, 41 U.S.L.W. 2390 
(Indiana Circuit Court, 15 January 1973). 
The plaintiffs in this case alleged that the Indiana 
system of public school financing, relying upon local prop­
erty taxes, results in disparities which constitute a viola­
tion of the equal protection provisions. 
The court found for the defendants, raising the ques­
tion whether the plaintiffs had adequately discharged their 
burden of proof that the disparities result in differences 
in "educational opportunities," and that some children have 
"substantially inferior" educational opportunities as com­
pared with others. 
The court cited the differences among educators regard­
ing a definition of equal educational opportunity, citing, in 
addition, that there is, however, general agreement that 
equal educational opportunity would require an unequal ex­
penditure of dollars. 
Going further, the court found that the system in 
Indiana is a "reasonable and rational system, not designed 
to, nor invidiously discriminating against, plaintiffs or 
others.^ 
25 
J enson v. Board of Tax Commi ssi oners, 41 U.S.L.W. 
2390 (Indiana Circuit Courts 15 January 1973). 
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Michigan 
Milliken v. Green, 203 N.W.2d 457 (1972), vacated 
212 N.W.2d 711 (1973). 
This highly politically controversial case began on 
15 October 1971 when Governor Milliken and the Attorney 
General sought a declaratory judgment in the Ingham County 
Circuit Court to test the constitutionality of the Michigan 
public school financing system on the grounds of violation 
of the equal protection clauses of the State and United 
States Constitutions. 
On 8' May 1972, the Circuit Court certified the question 
and on 29 December 1972 the Michigan Supreme Court held that 
the state school financing system 
. . . consisting of local, general ad valorem property 
taxes, and school aid appropriations, by relying on 
the wealth of local school districts as measured by 
the state equalized valuation of taxable property 
per student ... 26 
resulted in substantial inequality and denied equal pro­
tection of the laws guaranteed by the Michigan constitution. 
To this decision Justice Brennan fixed a most unusual 
27 . Addendum wherein he questioned the propriety of the methods 
used by Justice G. Mennen Williams to certify his opinion as 
^Milliken v. Green, 203 N.W.2d 457 (1972) at 457. 
^ibid. , at 474-476. 
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that of the majority, concludings 
When, in the name of all that is sacred in the 
administration of justice, will the members of this 
court turn a deaf ear to the siren call of executive 
and legislative politics, and come home to the dignity 
of judicial scholarships, judicial decisions, and judi­
cial restraints?28 
29 His dissent follows, and was, no doubt, contributory 
to the certification of a rehearing a year later, when on 14 
December 1973 Chief Justice T. M. Kavanagh vacated the prior 
. . . 30 opinion and dismissed the cause. Substantively, the court 
answered negatively the question raising a Federal Fourteenth 
Amendment claim, found no discrimination violative of Michi­
gan's Equal Protection Clause, and stipulated that the Michi­
gan Constitution allows a school district to tax itself for 
the education of students which may exceed the level in other 
31 districts. 
Significantly, the court pointed out that: 
Instead of substantiating with evidence their claim 
of educational inequities and demonstrating that a decree 
of this Court would overcome those inequities, all have 
concentrated exclusively on the disparities in taxable 
resources among local school districts.32 
^^ibid., at 476. 
^ibid. , at 476-488. 
30 
Milliken v. Green, 212 N.W.2d 711 (1973). 
"^ibid . , at 721. 
32ibid., at 719. 
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Later the court stated that* 
Even if it were made to appear that more money 
would eliminate constitutionally significant disparities 
between districts in the quantity or quality of educa­
tional services or opportunity, the remedy need not be 
to discard altogether the present tax machinery.33 
• * i • 
Because of definitional difficulties and differences 
in educational philosophy and student ability, motivation, 
background, etc., no system of public schools can provide 
equality of educational opportunity in all its diverse 
dimensions.34 
Minnesota 
Van Dusartz v. Hatfield, 334 F.Supp. 870 (1971). 
The plaintiffs were pupils who charged that the Minne­
sota school financing system resulted in making the quality 
of education a function of the wealth of the parents and 
district in which the pupil resides, thus violating the equal 
protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United 
States Constitution. 
On 12 October 1971, the United States District Court 
for the Third Division of the District of Minnesota supported 
the plaintiffs, concluding that the complaint stated a cause 
of action and declaring that 
. . . . a system of public school financing which makes 
spending per pupil a function of the school district's 
wealth violates the equal protection guarantee of the 
14th Amendment. . .35 
33. . ibid. 
"^ibid. , at 720. 
35 
Van Dusartz v. Hatfield. 344 F.Supp. 870 (1971) at 877. 
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The significance of this case hardly exceeds its 
existence because the finding was largely vacated by the 
"3 /r 
subsequent Rodriguez decision by the United States Supreme 
Court. It is interesting to note that the Van Dusartz court 
37 depended heavily on the Serrano I findings and upon the 
38 
thesis of Coons, Clune and Sugarman. 
Montana 
State ex. rel. Woodahl v. Straub, 520 P.2d 776 (1974). 
The state of Montana brought this suit against certain 
county officials who maintained that a 1973 tax discriminated 
against the taxpayers of their county by requiring them to 
pay more than is required for the support of its local 
schools, thus violating both the Montana and United States 
Constitutions. The law in question required counties rais­
ing more than the amount reeded to fund a "foundation pro­
gram" with a 40-mil property tax to pay any excess to the 
state for redistribution to other counties which may have 
raised less than the foundation amount. This is a "negative 
aid" to the wealthier counties. 
The court found for the state, denying that there 
3 6 
Rodriguez v. San Antonio, 411 U.S. 1 (1973). 
37 
Serrano v. Priest, 96 Cal.Rptr. 601 (1971). 
38 John E. Coons, William H. Clune III and Stephen D. 
Sugarman, Private Wealth and Public Education (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1970). 
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39 was any unconstitutionality. The court held the tax to be 
a state rather than a local tax, and supported its findings 
by precedent. 
However, it is almost unanimously held that it is 
no defense to the collection of a tax for a special pur­
pose that a person liable for the tax is not benefitted 
by the expenditure of the proceeds of the tax or not as 
much benefitted as others.40 
This case is included here to illustrate that the pro­
perty tax question is buffeted by both sides, those who pay 
and those who receive. 
New York 
Spano v. Board of Education of Lakeland Central School 
District No. 1_, 68 Misc.2d 804, 328 N.Y.S.2d 229 (1972). 
The plaintiff asked for a judgment declaring unconsti­
tutional New York's existing legislative and constitutional 
provisions for levying and distributing school taxes. 
The Supreme Court, Westchester County, on 17 January 
1972, granted a motion to dismiss on the grounds that the 
complaint failed to state a cause of action. The court dis-
41 . . missed the Serrano decision, stating that until otherwise 
vacated by the United' States Supreme Court, "The applicable 
State ex rel. Woodahl v. Straub, 520 P.2d 776 (1974) 
at 783. 
^ibid. , at 781. 
41  
Serrano v. Priest, 96 Cal.Rptr. 601 (1971). 
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. 42 43 law is contained m Mclnnis and Burruss." Justice 
Hawkins wrote that 
"One scholar, one dollar"—a suggested variant of 
the "one man—one vote" doctrine proclaimed in Baker v. 
Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 82 S.Ct. 691, 7 L.Ed.2d 663—may 
well become the law of the land. I submit, however, 
that to do so is the prerogative and within the "terri­
torial imperative" of the Legislature, or, under certain 
circumstances, of the United States Supreme Court.44 
Oregon 
Olsen v. State of Oregon, 554 P.2d 139 (1976). 
This was a class action brought in early 1972 on behalf 
of public school students in the state. The plaintiffs also 
included taxpayers and parents residing in districts with low-
wealth property bases. The plaintiffs contended that the 
Oregon system of financing public education is contrary to 
45 Article I, section 20, of the State Constitution, and 
46 Article VIII, section 3, of the State Constitution. 
4? 
Sub nom. Mclnnis v. Oqilvie, 394 U.S. 322 (1969). 
4̂ ? 
Burruss v. Wilkerson, 397 U.S. 44 (1970). 
44 
Spano v. Board of Education, 328 N.Y.S.2d 229 (1972) 
at 235. 
45 Oregon's Equal Protection Clauses "No law shall be 
passed granting to any citizen or class of citizens, or immu­
nities, which, upon the same terms, shall not equally belong 
to all citizens." 
46 "The Legislative Assembly shall provide by law for 
the extablishment of a uniform, and general system of Common 
schools." 
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The suit was tried in September, 1973, but it was 
not until 25 February 1975 that the trial court ruled 
against the plaintiffs. On 3 September 1976, the Supreme 
Court of Oregon affirmed the judgment. 
The court maintained that while it could interpret 
the equal protection clause of the Oregon constitution 
more broadly than that of the federal constitution, it 
4 found no legal basis for such a construction m this case. 
The court denied the allegation that the language of 
Article III, section 3, establishes education as a "funda­
mental interest." The court explained that in Oregon many 
laws which are usually considered legislation are inserted 
in the state constitution, and dismissed the idea that this 
raises everything so done to the category of a "fundamental 
48 interest." Cited as an example: 
Article I, section 39, of the Oregon Constitution, 
Oregon's Bill of R ghts, provides that it is a guaran­
teed constitutional right to sell and serve intoxicat­
ing liquor by the drink. According to the analysis of 
Rodriguez, this would make that right a "fundamental 
interest.49 
In refusing to find that explicit mention in the constitu­
tion was controlling, the court adopted a "balancing test," 
47 
Olsen v. State of Oregon, 554 P.2d 139 (1976) at 143. 
^ibid . , at 144-145. 
49., . , ibid. 
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an approach in which the court 
. . . weights the detriment to the education of the 
children of certain districts against the ostensible 
justification for the scheme of school financing.50 
The court found that the interest impinged upon—educational 
opportunity—was outweighed by the state's concern in main­
taining local control. 
In Oregon this emphasis on local control is 
constitutionally accepted. Art. XI, section 2 and 
Art. VI, section 10, of the Oregon Constitution pro­
vide for home rule by cities and counties; that is, 
the voters of the cities and counties can enact their 
own charters which shall govern on matters of city or 
county concern. 
The Court was also not convinced by the plaintiffs 
that there was a violation of Article VIII, section 3. The 
Opinion stated that the provision is met 
. . . if the state requires and provides for a minimum 
of educational opportunities in the district and permits 
the districts to exercise local control over what they 
desire, and can furnish, over the minimum.52 
Washington 
Northshore School District No. 417 v. Kinnear, 530 P.2d 
178 (1974). 
The plaintiffs were 25 (out of 320) school districts 
of the state of Washington, their directors, resident parents, 
taxpayers and children. They brought an original petition 
~^ibid., at 145. 
~^ibid. , at 147. 
52ibid., at 148. 
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to the Supreme Court of Washington in April, 1972, for a 
writ of prohibition and mandamus to declare the state's 
system of funding its public schools unconstitutional and 
to prohibit state officers from collecting and disbursing 
public funds to support it. They alleged that the system 
makes the quality of education a function of taxable district 
wealth, resulting in substantial disparity in taxation and 
expenditures and in quality and extent of available educa­
tional opportunities. They alleged also that the state 
was therefore in violation of its duty to provide for the 
53 ample provision of education, and of its duty to provide 
54 a general and uniform system of public schools. The plain­
tiffs asked the court to declare the financing system void 
as repugnant to the equal protection clauses of the state 
55 constitution, and the Fourteenth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution. 
On 16 December 1974, the Supreme Court of Washington 
upheld the state's educational finance statutory structure. 
The decision was a bitter 6-3 split. Five separate 
opinions were filed. Three judges concurred in the Opinion 
without reservation, three concurred in the result, and 
5 3  . . .  Washington Constitution, Article 9, section 1. 
54 ibid., Article 9, section 2. 
55 Article 1, section 12. 
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three dissented. 
The court found that a 
. . . general and uniform system . . . is . . . one 
in which every child in the state has free access to 
certain minimum and reasonably standardized educational 
facilities. 
The Opinion held that 
. . . assessed valuation per pupil not only had little 
to do with the quality of education in the ennumerated 
districts, but that no decision as to the equal pro­
tection of the laws nor th_. paramount duty to provide 
uniform education can be based upon it. The signifi­
cance of assessed valuation per pupil is thus inconstant, 
tenuous, superficial and coincidental only.57 
Three justices joined in an at least equally strongly 
worded dissent which characterized the plurality opinion 
as a "legal pygmy of doubtful origin . . . (that) may be 
58 
short lived," and done in a "cavalier manner." They 
accused the majority of ignoring facts which, in their 
opinion, did show a direct relationship between assessed 
valuation per pupil and expenditures per pupil, but the 
dissent did avoid claiming a direct relationship between 
59 expenditures and quality of education. 
56 Northshore School District No. 417 v. Kinnear, 
530 P.2d 148 (1974), at 202. 
57. . ibid., at 191. 
58., ibid., at 204. 
59. . ibid., at 204-224. cf. at 220 re quality of 
education. 
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Wisconsin 
Buse v. Smith, 247 N.W.2d 141 (1976). 
The plaintiffs in this case were certain school 
districts, residents, taxpayers, school board members, and 
parents of school children who brought action for declar­
atory judgment that the negative-aid provisions of the 
school district financing system, by which certain school 
districts would be required to pay a portion of their 
property tax revenues into a general state fund for redis­
tribution to other school districts, were unconstitutional. 
The Wisconsin legislature had enacted this system in an 
attempt to remove property wealth as a factor in determining 
the amount of educational expenditures per pupil. 
On 30 November 1976, the Wisconsin Supreme Court 
struck down the negative aid provisions of the school 
finance law. They found that the negative aid provisions 
did not violate due process or equal protection rights of 
taxpayers in negative-aid districts,^ but concluded that 
under Article VIII, section 1 of the Wisconsin Constitution, 
. . . the state cannot compel one school district to 
levy and collect a tax for the direct benefit of other 
school districts, or for the sole benefit of the state.61 
60 
Buse v. Smith, 247 N.W.2d 141 (1976), at 155. 
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The three dissenting justices held that the purpose 
of school districts is not merely to educate their own 
6 2 children, but to share in the state system costs. 
Wyoming 
Sweetwater County Planning Committee v. Hinkle, 491 
P.2d 1234 (1971), juris, rel. 493 P.2d 1050 (1972). 
The appellants (at the district court level) were a 
group of school administrators, citizens, and taxpayers who 
sought relief from a plan of organizing school districts by 
the Sweetwater County Planning Commission for the Organiza­
tion of School Districts. The goal of the Commission was 
to join an affluent school district with a poorer district 
so as to provide equivalent educational opportunities for 
all students concerned. 
The district court found for the appellants, basing 
the decision primarily upon the practicable near impossi­
bility of a satisfactory working agreement between the 
6 3 districts involved. The case was remanded to a state 
committee with instructions to reject the plan of organi­
zation which the county planning committee had proposed. 
The county committee was permitted to intervene in the 
62ibid., at 156-168. 
6 3 Explained by the Supreme Court of Wyoming in its 
introduction to 491 P.2d 1234. See also at 1235. 
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procedure, and appealed the matter to the Wyoming Supreme 
Court. That court held on 14 December 1971 that the pro­
posed plan was not a satisfactory solution to the problem, 
and directed the matter, with suggestions, to the state 
legislature. 
The court was in favor of a state-wide, uniform tax, 
stating that Article 1, section 28 of the Wyoming Constitu­
tion provides that all taxation shall be equal and uniform. 
We see no manner in which ad valorem taxes for 
school purposes can be made equal and uniform unless 
it is done on a state-wide basis. In other words, all 
property owners within the state should be required to 
pay the same total mill levy for school purposes.®^ 
But the court recognized that the Wyoming Constitution makes 
the operation of such an idea impracticable without explicit 
legislation. 
Art. 15, sec. 17, Wyoming Constitution, provides 
there shall be levied each year in each county a tax of 
12 mills on the dollar for the support and maintenance 
of public schools. This tax is collected by the county 
treasurer and disbursed among the school districts 
"within the county." In as much as this levy is manda­
tory and a constitutional requirement, it will neces­
sarily continue. 
Art. 15, sec. 15, Wyoming Constitution, authorizes 
a state tax not exceeding six mills on the dollar to 
be levied each year for support of public schools in 
the state. There is no need for any change in what is 
64 
Sweetwater County Planning Committee v. Hinkle, 
491 P.2d 1234 (1971), at 1237. 
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being done with respect to the levy of this tax and 
the distribution of funds derived from such levy.65 
What the court wanted, was an additional state tax, the 
proceeds of which would be distributed by the state treas­
urer by a formula which would provide each district with 
the same 
. . . share per classroom unit, when its allotment 
from the countywide 12-mill school levy and its 
additional allotment from the state treasurer are 
added together.66 
The court also recognized that the joining of districts 
caused the possibility (and an actual case was cited) of a 
situation where residents of one district would have to 
assume responsibility for the bonded indebtedness of another. 
The original appellants claimed this to be a violation of 
Article 16, section 4, of the Wyoming Constitution, which 
specifies: 
No debt in excess of the taxes for the current 
year shall, in any manner, be created by any county 
or sub-division thereof . . . unless the proposition 
to create such debt shall have been submitted to a 
vote of the people thereof and by them approved. 
The court retained jurisdiction in the matter until 
after the state legislature adjourned in 1973. The court 
expected the legislature "to equalize ad valorem taxes for 
^ibid. , at 1237. 
^ibid. s at 1238. 
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67 
school purposes on a statewide basis, ..." 
On 15 February 1972, the Wyoming Supreme Court 
68 
relinquished that jurisdiction which it had retained. It 
f ound that % 
The varying petitions and requests presented to 
the court since our original opinion make it clear 
the court is being called upon to perform a function 
which does not properly belong to our court, i.e., that 
of completing the reorganization of school districts in 
Sweetwater County. Such petitions and requests have 
also made it clear that our retaining of jurisdiction 
is hampering and interfering with the proper performance 
of duties by duly constituted school administration 
officials. 
The court further declared thats 
The state committee therefore has jurisdiction and 
the right to reorganize any of the Sweetwater County 
territories into a unified school district or districts. 
We cannot anticipate what problems may or may not 
arise if and when this is done.^O 
k^ibid., at 1239. 
68 Sweetwater County Planning Committee v. Hihkle, 
493 P.2d 1050. 
69 
ibid., at 1051. 
'^ibid., at 1052. 
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TABLE I 
SUMMARY OF SELECTED COURT DECISIONS 
ON PROPERTY TAX FUNDING OF PUBLIC EDUCATION 
Highest Judicial Level Attained 
Local 
State Circuit & State U. S. U. S. Property 
of Other Supreme District Supreme Tax Method 
Origin Name Courts Court Court Court Sustained 
IL Mclnnis X yes 
VA ' Burruss X yes 
FL Hargrave X yes 
MN Van Dusartz X no 
CA Serrano X no 
WY Sweetwater X no 
NY Spa no X yes 
AZ Hoi1ins X yes 
IN Jenson X yes 
MI Milliken X yes 
TX Rodriguez X yes 
MT Woodahl X yes 
WA Northshore X yes 
ID Thompson X yes 
NJ Robinson X no 
IL Jones X yes 
OR 01 sen X yes 
WI Buse X yes 
CT Horton X no 
Federal Court Reporter System 
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CHAPTER V 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
Summary 
All states use the tax on real property to some degree 
in the financing of public elementary and secondary education. 
The problem of this usage stems largely from the local control 
of the collection and disbursement of the monies by the 
individual school districts. This method is claimed by some 
to create inequities whereby the quality of available educa­
tional opportunity rests on the wealth of the school district 
in which the student resides. Reformers have sought relief 
from these alleged inequities in both the United States 
Constitution's Fourteenth Amendment, and also in the equal 
protection provisions of the various state constitutions. 
The data for this study are contained primarily in 
significant court cases from 1968 to the present. Additional 
data hare been collected through a review of the literature, 
which intensified in quantity primarily during the interim 
between Serrano v. Priest in 1971 and Rodriguez v. San 
Antonio Independent School District in 1973. 
An analysis shows that the Fourteenth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution is no longer a viable claim in a 
solution to the wealth versus equal educational opportunity 
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problem, and that available redress must be sought in the 
various state courts. At the present time there appears to 
be a decline in interest in legal prosecution, due, perhaps, 
to the financial problem of developing a viable alternative 
to taxing property and the distribution of the proceeds by 
the collecting districts. 
The Courts have avoided dictating alternatives to this 
historic method of funding. The courts have also disagreed 
with one another directly on specific interpretations, and 
disagreed on the finer points of legal distinctions among 
the state constitutions, thus complicating the value of 
legal precedents. 
This study presents a chronological overview of land­
mark decisions, with supportive cases, thus providing a 
cohesive, chronological treatise of the legal aspects of 
funding public education through the property tax. It shows 
what approaches have been tried, and seeks to direct future 
action into a middle course. 
In the preparation of such a study as this, one of so 
controversial a nature, it is impossible to convey the real 
atmosphere of the subject without the occasional reflection 
of the passions involved. To filter out completely the 
emotional reactions to the problem would rather do a 
disservice to the reader by creating a false impression of 
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a problem which is apparently beyond a sterile, clinical 
approach to solution. The writer therefore bespeaks the 
tolerance of the readers, on the grounds that the presenta­
tion necessitates an element of realism, recognizing the 
strong disparity of opinion which exists. 
Conclusions 
With the existing conflicts in the positions courts 
have taken, it is difficult to arrive at definite conclu­
sions in the concepts framing this study. However, the 
courts have established certain factors which may be 
identified as conclusive. These are offered in the nature 
of guidelines to those who must live with this problem and 
continue to effect a solution. 
1 - Education is not a fundamental right within the 
explicit or implicit provisions of the United States Consti­
tution. 
2 - The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution has not yet 
been a ground upon which to base successful claims of rights 
to equal educational opportunity. 
3 - Education may be established as a fundamental 
right within a given state provided that the individual 
state constitution affords either explicit or implicit 
provisions to that effect. 
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4 - It is extremely difficult to analyze state school 
funding equalization decisions, or legislative actions, and 
predict with any accuracy how another state court will rule 
in a seemingly similar situation, primarily because state 
courts have established no pattern of acceptance of pre­
cedents. 
5 - Alternatives to property tax funding are not 
universally popular. There appears to be a reluctance to 
change on the part of the general public. 
6 - It has been virtually impossible to obtain accept­
able definitions of such important concepts as "equal edu­
cational opportunity" and "thorough and efficient" education 
in spite of the paramount need by the courts for the stand­
ardization of such fundamentals. 
7 - The attempt to relate the wealth of a district to 
the quality of educational opportunity will continue to be 
a major factor in the struggle for the reform of funding 
public education. 
8 - The courts will continue to exert a strong influ­
ence in the areas of public school funding and in the reform­
ation of such programs. 
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